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Financial institutions develop in response to economic needs. As 
is true of most businesses, their growth patterns are determined in 
large measure by the competitive environment within which they exist. 
However, these growth patterns are also shaped by the legal framework 
which governs and regulates them. From this latter cause-and-effect 
relationship, very difficult problems of public policy arise. The form 
and thrust of financial regulation in this country have been a source 
of enormous controversy almost since the day the Declaration of 
Independence was signed [l]. 
Alternative forms of banking structure exist within the United 
States. The particular form in effect at a particular location is a 
matter of state law. Generally, there are two forms of structure: 
single-office banking and multiple-office banking. Each type has 
several variations. 
Single-office, or 11 unit", banking is a system in which a banking 
firm operates a single banking business from a single place of business. 
Thi5 is the banking structure authorized by Oklahoma law. Unit banks 
in Oklahoma are permitted by the law to operate "auxiliary teller's 
windows" at a detached but nearby location only for the purposes of 
receiving deposits, paying withdrawals, making change, and otherwise 
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servicing depositor accounts. Functionally, these activities take the 
form of 11 drive-in 11 facilities. Present Oklahoma law also permits unit 
banks to operate detached automated teller machines. 
With respect to bank ownership, two variations within unit banking 
are present in Oklahoma. One is the one-bank holding company (OBHC 
hereafter). In this form of ownership, one corporation may hold 
ownership control of several businesses, one of which is a bank. 
Within such a corporate structure, the bank is a subsidiary of the 
holding company, operated separately from the holding company's other 
subsidiaries. 
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The second variation in unit banking is the chain bank. A chain 
bank exists when some degree of controi over two or more independent 
unit banks is held by one individual or group of individuals. Such 
control is exercised through common directorships and/or stock ownership. 
Many chain banks are also subsidiaries of OHBC's. 
Multiple-office banking is the general alternative to unit banking. 
It has two forms: branch banking, and the multiple-bank holding company 
(MBHC hereafter). In both forms, one business organization operates 
two or more bank "offices", the difference between the two forms being 
that in branch banking the offices are directly owned and operated as 
parts of a single organization, while in a MBHC the offices are 
separate businesses, all owned and operated by a single parent corpora-
tion. All forms of multiple-office banking are prohibited in Oklahoma. 
Regardless of the banking structure which exists in the state, the 
chosen structure should support and enhance the economic well-being of 
the population. Economic prosperity and development should not be 
impeded by the banking structure employed. Therefore, it is worthwhile 
to investigate the performance of the present structure of banking in 
Oklahoma. 
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Some evidence exists concerning the level of user-satisfaction 
produced by the present unit system. Stanton [43] reported survey 
results which indicate that small manufacturers often experience extreme 
difficulty in obtaining needed funds within the state. Barth [2] found 
that while farmers and ranchers seem satisfied with the quality of 
service at their banks, there were desired services which the local 
bank often did not offer. Although this evidence is limited, both 
studies indicate that some degree of dissatisfaction with the perform-
ance of the present unit system probably exists. 
Empirical evidence supports reasonably well the proposition that 
multiple-office banking systems produce operating performance 
characteristics which are generally superior to results produced by 
unit systems. However, no research on the performance of the Oklahoma 
banking structure has been reported nor have any investigations of 
performance been located which were directed toward chain banking 
anywhere. In 1962, Darnell [11] produced the major descriptive work, 
to date, on chain banking. He reported 82 chain banks in Oklahoma, 
which constituted 36.3 percent of all member banks in the state and 
held 32.7 percent of the assets of all member banks. Although uncor-
roborated by other research, Darnell's data do indicate that chain 
banking constituted a substantial part of the banking structure in 
'Oklahoma nearly two decades ago. 
A summary of the existing knowledge about the Oklahoma banking 
structure suggests that (1) Oklahoma permits unit banking only, 
(2) nearly 20 years ago, chain banks accounted for a substantial part 
of banking activity in Oklahoma, and (3) some degree of user-dissatis-
faction with the present structure appears to exist. Nothing is known 
about the performance of the Oklahoma banking structure relative to 
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banking systems elsewhere. Nor is anything known about the operating 
characteristics or competitive conditions produced by chain bank systems 
wherever located. 
Hopefully, policy-makers in Oklahoma are concerned about the 
capability of the present banking industry to provide the funds 
necessary to support anticipated economic expansion. Ben-Avi [3] 
estimated that during the period of 1985-2000, an additional 355 million 
dollars annually will be needed to finance projected economic growth in 
Oklahoma. That amount is more than three times the average increase'in 
commercial and industrial lending by Oklahoma banks during the decade 
of 1966-1975 [3]. If such a dramatic increase in financial requirements 
for industrial development is to be met by the banking system, one of 
the goals of public policy in Oklahoma must be to provide a banking 
structure that encourages maximum economic efficiency. Economic growth 
should not be restrained by the structure of the banking industry. 
Such a huge, anticipated need for new financing makes it imperative to 
expand understanding of the performance of the present structure. 
Purpose of the Research 
The major problem in the analysis of chain banking has been the 
lack of information identifying banks involved in chain relationships. 
The purpose of this investigation is to identify all chain banks in 
the State of Oklahoma and empirically analyze the performance character-
istics produced by a chain bank structure. Chain banking is widely 
hypothesized to provide a method by which bankers attempt to secure the 
benefits of multiple-office banking in states which prohibit those forms 
of bank ownership. The proposed research addresses that argument by 
investigating the nature and extent of chain banking in Oklahoma. The 
performance of the chain banks will be measured and compared to that of 
the unit banks to evaluate the relative performance differences. In 
addition, the empirical results will be compared to those of previous 
investigations to determine if the performance of the Oklahoma chain 
structure resembles that of multiple-office systems in other states. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Definition of Chain Banking 
The term 11 chain banking 11 is used to denote a phenomenon of bank 
ownership which has no legal or regulatory recognition. Loosely 
defined, a chain bank exists when two or more independent, unit banks 
are controlled by the same individual or group of individuals. Because 
chain banks appear in some respect to resemble other formal types of 
multiple-office banks, chain banking is often suggested to be a means 
of circumventing state laws prohibiting multiple-office banking. 
Chain bank relationships are not reported to any regulatory agency, 
and because bank stock changes hands rather infrequently, chain banks 
usually exist with little or no public recognition. The lack of 
published information identifying banks involved in chain relationships 
presents a major obstacle to proper analysis of the effects of chain 
association. 
A Valuation Model of the Banking Firm 
The general capitalization of income model of asset valuation 
provides the foundation for analyzing the effects of chain bank associa-
tion. The model states that: 
00 ct 
v = L: 
0 t=l (1 + k)t 
(1) 
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where v0 is the present value of the asset, Ct is the net cash flow 
produced by the asset in period t (whether in the form of dividends or 
capital gain), and k is the discount rate ap~ropriate to the time 
preference and risk aversion of the owner(s). It is assumed that bank 
managers endeavor to maximize the va 1 ue of their firms .. 
A form of Equation (1), more convenient to this analysis is: 
7 
oo Rt - (Ct + Qt + Tt)· 
v = 2: --------
0 t=l [l + (i + p)t 
(2) 
in which R signifies the gross receipts from the bank's assets and 
services, C denotes the costs of its liabilities and capital, 0 repre-
sents the overhead costs associated with R and C, and T is the tax 
paid by the bank [20]. The risk-free interest rate is estimated by 
i, and pis the risk premium appropriate to the bank's assets and 
liabilities. 
Given that bank managers are wealth maximizers, it foilows that 
they form chain relationships because of expected increments to firm 
value. The market for the shares of most banks is negotiated and 
inefficient, which makes any change in v0 resulting from participation 
in a chain difficult if not impossible to observe directly. Thus, in 
order to determine if chain bank.membership affects firm value, it is 
necessary to examine the behavior of the variables of chain. bank 
performance. 
Equation (2) makes readily apparent the interdependent nature of 
the variables. The bank gathers funds from its liability and capital 
sources and pays C for their use. It places those funds into assets 
which generate R. 0 will depend, in part, on the particular assets 
and liabilities selected, and it will reflect fixed costs as well. 
T =· f[R - (C + 0), and p will be influenced by the riskiness of the 
particular assets and liabilities the bank chooses, although it is an 
exogenous variable. 
If chain bankers perceive chain membership to provide them with 
opportunities unavailable to unit bank competitors, they will adjust 
their behavior to exploit those opportunities. Suppose, for example, 
a unit banker purchases control of another unit bank, forming a chain. 
He may conclude his overall risk position has been thereby reduced. 
Therefore, he is able to lower the joint level of cash reserves in the 
two banks, and increase the joint level of auto loans held. Reflecting 
those decisions, the cash reserves to total asset ratios would decline 
and the total loans to total assets ratios would rise. These results 
would be observable from public information. 
If the hypothetical banker were able to rearrange his assets 
successfully, as suggested, Rt at both banks would rise reflecting the 
higher interest rates on auto loans, Ct will remain unchanged except 
as bad debt losses increase, and Tt will rise, but less than Rt. The 
risk premium, p, will remain stationary or decline, and the overall 
result is that v0 will rise. Thus, the banker improved the value of 
both banks through the formation of a chain. 
From the preceding rationale, the overall hypothesis of this 
research emerges: the performance of chain banks in Oklahoma, on the 




A unit bank ordinarily is heavily dependent upon the local economy 
8 
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because a bank's market area is small geographically, at least until 
the bank becomes quite large. In Oklahoma, probably fewer than 20 banks 
have significant market penetration beyond the county line. As a 
result of such market compactness, loan portfolios and deposit sources 
of neighboring banks tend to be rather homogeneous, which suggests the 
covariances of returns of local unit banks probably are quite high, 
particularly in rural areas. 
Modern portfolio theory suggests that the variance of returns·for 
two unit banks A and B may be reduced by combining the assets of both 
banks into a single portfolio [20]. A diversification effect will 
occur and reduce the unsystematic risk present in both banks, provided 
the coefficient of correlation of the banks' returns is less than one 
(pAB < 1). Reduction of any diversifiable risk present in the unit 
banks through a portfolio effect will decrease the variance of the 
aggregate cash flows for the chain below the variance of each unit bank 
considered separately, and increase aggregate firm values, ceteris 
paribus. The ability, created by chain bank association~ of the 
individual chain members to be considered as parts of a single, large 
portfolio, thereby altering the risk-return relationships of all chain 
members simultaneously, is possibly the chief benefit to be derived 
from chain banking. 
Analysis of the effects of diversification upon chain bank value 
requires that the effects on return be considered separately from 
effects upon risk. The expected return from a portfolio of assets is 
the weighted average of the expected returns from the individual assets 
which may be expressed as follows: 
n T 
E(r) = Z. X.( Z p.tr.t) 
p i=l l t=l l l 
(3) 
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the expected portfolio return, where _E(rp) = 
. x. = 
1 
the fraction of the total equity invested in the ;th asset, 
n 
such that r x. = 1, 
. 1 1 1= 
Pit= the probability of tth rate of return from asset i, and 
. th 
rit =the t rate of return on asset i. 
Diversification, in the sense used here, will not affect E(rp). 
That is to say, combining a group of individual financial assets into 
one bundle will not change the return from any of them individually or 
in the aggregate. Only the actions of bank managers in response to 
perceived changes in portfolio risk will alter the expected return from 
an asset portfolio existing in equilibrium conditions. 
However, considering the asset portfolios of several unit banks to 
be parts of a la~ger, single portfolio may reduce the risk premium, p, 
in Equation (2). 
where 
Total portfolio risk is often expressed as [20]: 
n 2 2 n n 
Va.r(rp) = r X. a. + ~ ~ X.X.a .. 
i=l 1 1 i=lj=llJlJ 
a~ = the variance of return on the ;th asset, 
1 
j = the jth asset, and 
a . . lJ 
= the covariance of returns of the ;th and the jth assets 
when i f j and n is any positive integer..::_ 2. 
(4) 
It is apparent that total 'risk will be reduced if the returns of 
assets i and j are less than perfectly correlated; i.e., if pij < 1. 
Viewed through Equation (2), the ability of the chain bank to obtain 
positive diversification effects suggests that: 
~-- (C + + T)A + R8 - (C + 0 + T) 8 
[1 +·(; + pA)J [l + (i + p8)J 
RA+B - (C + 0 + T)A+B 
<~~~~~~~~~ 
[ 1 + ( i + p AB ) J (5) 
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in which pAB is th~ risk premium for the chain bank after portfolio 
effects. 1 Thus the availability of positive benefits accruing from the 
diversification effect makes it attractive for unit banks to become 
associated in a chain structure with unit banks in other locations 
having different economic environments. 
Chain bank managers may react to reduced risk levels in several 
ways. They may choose not to alter the behavior of chain members at 
all and simply enjoy the increased value of their less risky unit banks. 
In this case, the behavior of chain banks will be no different from 
that of independent, unit banks in Oklahoma. 
On the other hand, chain bank management may view any reduction of 
risk obtained through chain bank association as a competitive advantage 
to be exploited by accepting higher risk assets and liabilities than 
before. A wider investment in varied economic markets will reduce 
default risk, and that will make possible more aggressive portfolios. 
On the asset side, central management could decide to reduce cash 
reserves and accept more high-risk, high-yield loans. If so, cash 
reserves to total assets ratios would fall and total loans to total 
assets ratios would rise. A reallocation of credit toward the local 
communities is implied by such a decision. A significant rise in the 
ratios of municipal securities to total assets, consumer loans to total 
assets, residential mortgage loans to total assets, and commercial 
loans to total assets would be expected. Possible diversification 
effects on the li~bility side are discussed below. 
1While it is true that [RA - (C + 0 + T)A] + [Rs - (C + 0 + T)s] = 
[RA+B - (C + 0 + T)A+B], in no sense is it true that PA+ PB = PAB· 
The risk premiums, PA, PB, and PAB' reflect the investor-perceived 
riskiness of the cash flows produced by unit banks A and B and the joint 
chain bank AB. PAB is not a weighted average of the two individual 
returns. 
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Previous research generally supports the riskier-behavior posture 
of chain banks relative to unit banks as just described, and that is the 
hypothesis of this research as well. 
Capital Position and Liability Structure 
Chain bank members may experience a diversification effect upon 
their liabilities if their sources of deposits are independent of each 
other and subject to different economic influences. The general 
formulas for determining return and risk of an _!!-asset portfolio 
expressed in Equations (3) and (4) respectively, apply to the _!!-liability 
portfolio as well. Therefore, the essence of the diversification effect 
upon liabilities of the chain bank lies in the correlation of cash 
inflows from the deposit sources of the chain members. If Bank A were 
urban and its local economy predominately industrial, while associated 
Bank B were rural and subject to agricultural influences, their combined 
liabilities may show a greater stability of deposit inflows and outflows 
as a result of diversification effects. Bank managers may then perceive 
the greater stability of their overall liabilities as requiring a 
smaller base of permanent capital and decide to adopt a more aggresive 
liability management strategy. If so, a higher degree of leverage is 
implied, along with a willingness to pay higher prices for deposits 
and to extend maturities. 
Additional effects from chain membership may occur in the capital 
account. Because·of the absence of a public market for their shares, 
small, unit banks may experience difficulty raising additional capital 
through the sale of new stock. Growth capital in that case, would be 
limited to additions to undivided profits or the sale of capital notes 
(also likely to be difficult or impossible). Even retention of profits 
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may be quite restricted. The owners of small banks often are also the 
officers and directors and they may inflate wages and salaries in order 
to shield bank income from income tax. Chain banks may find capital 
markets more accessible, and they may be more willing to allow undis-
tributed profits to grow at a faster rate in order to enhance capital 
appreciation. Moreover, the improved availability of capital may be 
viewed by the central chain management as augmenting any diversification 
effect on their liabilities and that may lead them to even more aggres-
sive liability management policies. 
An improved capital position would be reflected by a rise in a· 
bank's ratio of total capital to total assets. The implied reduced 
risk level of the firm will permit the risk premium, p, in Equation (2) 
to decline, and firm value would rise. However, it seems more likely 
that chain bank managers, perceiving less variation in their liability 
flows, would choose to lever up instead of down in response to favorable 
diversification effects, thereby causing p to rise rather than fall. 
Therefore, the total capital to total assets ratio is hypothesized to 
be lower for chain banks than for unit banks. 
In the valuation model, C will rise as the bank adds to its 
liabilities, R should rise more than C, and Twill also rise. Whether 
or not V rises will depend on the rise in R relative to those of C, 
T, and p. However, the entire idea is to get R to increase more 
rapidly than C, T, or p. A move toward increased leverage would also 
imply support for the previously stated hypothesis of higher total 
loans to total asset ratios for chain banks. As chain members increase 
their deposits, it follows that those funds will be used to increase 
loans of various types, rather than safer cash balances. 
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Operational Efficiency 
Pure economies of scale are not likely to result from chain banking 
simply because of the physical separation, and often wide geographic 
distance, between chain members. Any opportunities for chain banks to 
achieve cost advantages over comparably sized unit banks arises from 
the potential ability of chain bank management to centralize certain 
service functions, thereby eliminating duplication of effort'. Such 
activities might include purchasing, computer facilities and operation, 
investment portfolio supervision, and certain trust and correspondent 
functions. 
However, if the lead bank in a chain does perform some functions 
for other chain members, such as those just mentioned, the lead bank is 
also likely to charge transfer fees for those services. While the 
ability to eliminate duplicate activities implies that chain banks may 
be able to operate with relatively fewer employees than unit banks, 
and that total salaries, wages, and benefits may be relatively lower 
for chains, tactical transfer pricing decisions adverse to chain members 
may be made by central management for a variety of reasons unrelated to 
cost. For example, management may prefer, for tax reasons, to transfer 
income from a chain member to the lead bank in the form of transfer 
fees rather than as dividends. Or it may be desirable for the lead 
bank to show high profits in order to enhance public offerings of 
securities. Transfer fees paid show up as Other Operating Expenses, 
which suggests that chain bank results here will be worse than those 
produced by unit banks. 
Diversification effects arising from chain association may also 
indirect1y affect some chain bank costs unfavorably. If diversifica-
tion effects do induce management to make riskier loans, the loan loss 
15 
ratio is likely to rise. Such a result will be reflected in this study 
by the total operating expense to total assets ratio. 
In this section, influences upon several variables of the valuation 
model, Equation (2), have been described. Some ·of those influences are 
likely to be favorable to chain banks, while others are ~nfavorable. 
While the overall effect of chain banking upon costs is unclear, it is 
hypothesized that: (1) chain bank net income per employee is higher 
than for unit banks; (2) the ratio of labor costs to total assets is 
lower for chain banks than for unit banks; (3) the ratio of other 
operating expenses to total assets is higher for chain banks; and 
(4) the ratio of total operating expenses to total assets is lower for 
chain banks relative to unit banks. 
Rates on Deposits and Loans 
If diversification effects from chain association induce bank 
managers to shift funds out of relatively safe, low-yield treasury 
instruments into riskier assets such as commercial loans, auto loans, 
etc., it follows that the average return on its asset portfolio should 
increase. Management may also choose to lower its credit standards 
in order to achieve higher rates of interest.on the loan portfolio. 
On the liability side, a more aggressive deposit acquisition 
strategy will require payment of higher interest rates. Thus, chain 
banks, on the average could be expected to charge higher interest rates 
on assets and to pay higher interest rates on liabilities than unit 
banks do. It is hypothesized that chain banks have higher ratios of 
interest and fees on loans to total loans and of interest on deposits 
to total deposits than unit banks do. 
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The practices of banks levying service charges on customer accounts 
presents something of an enigma. Previous researchers are virtually 
unanimous in finding that multiple-office banks levy higher service 
charges than unit banks. Yet, no theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenom has emerged. Perhaps the most plausible explanation stems 
from the observation that multiple-office banks on the average, are 
larger than unit banks. This size difference allows multiple-office 
banks to engage more in wholesale banking in which the customer is a 
business carrying on both checking and borrowing activities, whereas 
the smaller unit banks tend to emphasize individual accounts which 
involve checking and time deposits. The wholesale banker prices out 
his services more carefully and explicitly while the retail banker 
relies more on low cost checking accounts to attract time deposits. 
In any event, the observed association between multiple-office 
banks and higher service charges is very strong. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized here that chain banks levy higher service charges than 
unit banks. 
Profitability 
To the extent that chain bank membership produces significant 
economies of scale of operations, and/or encourages the use of increased 
financial leverage, bank profitability could be expected to increase. 
Most of the performance characteristics discussed above are expected 
to be improved by· chain membership. Therefore, it follows that overall 
measures of profitability should show improvement as well. However, 
it is possible that various chain influences will prove to be offsetting 
and no improvement in overall profitability will occur. In that case, 
any impact on firm value will depend upon what happens to the risk 
premium. 
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It is possible, of course, that management's underlying motive for 
chain association could be to gain monopoly power, in which case it 
would form a chain within its own local market. Efforts to improve 
profitability would then be likely to cause other measures of perform-
ance to move opposite to a priori expectations consistent with portfolio 
theory. Asset portfolios probably would become safer and more liquid, 
the pricing spread would probably widen, and leverage and the risk 
premium would decline. This is not a likely scenario, however, because 
local-market banks generally tend to behave as discriminating 
monopolists [42], thus limiting the benefits to be gained from other 
monopoly-seeking activity. Moreover, formation of a chain in the same 
market would severely limit, if not eliminate the possibility of 
obtaining diversification effects from chain association. 
All measures of profitability to be tested in this research, total 
revenues to total assets, net income to total assets, and net income 
to total capital, are hypothesized to be higher for chain banks than 
for unit banks. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EVIDENCE ON CHAIN BANKING AND 
BANK PERFORMANCE 
Chain Banking 
Through the years, data on chain banking have been considered 
unreliable because of the difficulty of determining chain ownership. 
Consequently, few studies have appeared. Those which did were descrip-
tive in nature. 
The Federal Reserve collected and published data on chain banks for 
the first time in 1931. Subsequent studies appeared in 1939, 1941, and 
1945. After 1945, the Federal Reserve ceased publishing information on 
chains, probably because the data continued to be unreliable. 
In 1962, the Federal Reserve collected data on the 20 largest 
stockholders in all member banks and those figures were published in 
1964 [48]. Using that information, Darnell [8] [9] [10] [11] produced 
the only comprehensive work on chain banking since Cartinhour's 
chronicle [6] in 1931. 
The chain bank segment of the U. S. commercial banking appears to 
be substantial. Darnell [8] reported that 19 percent of all member 
banks in the nation were chain affiliated and these chain banks held 
19.3 percent of all member bank assets. The typical chain bank was 
only slightly larger than the average member bank and the typical 
chain consisted of only two or three banks [8]. However, about three 
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out of four chains were located in areas where the probability of facing 
competition from more than one other local bank was less than one-half 
[8]. 
Darnell [8] located 82 chain banks in Oklahoma, which placed 
Oklahoma third among all states in 1962. Those 82 chain banks were 
36.3 percent of all member banks in the state and 21.2 percent of all 
insured banks. They held 32.7 percent of member bank assets and 27.4 
percent of insured bank assets. 
Table I depicts the change in chain banking as reported by the 
FRS studies and Darnell [8]. 
The sharp declines in Oklahoma for 1945 reported in Table I were 
not explained. However, in view of the large gains registered by 1962, 
the 1945 data must be viewed suspiciously. 
Darnell [9] found that the large chains were located in states 
which permit only unit banking. Furthermore, Darnell [9] tested and 
rejected the hypothesis that chain banks behave like unit banks in the 
same state, and he concluded that where branching is prohibited, chain 
banking develops as a substitute. 
In a recent study of chain banking activity in the Seventh FRS 
District, Keating [26] found that 12.2 percent of the banks in the 
District were chain affiliated. Those banks held about 11 percent of 
all commercial bank deposits in the Seventh District. The average 
chain bank held deposits of about $42 million versus about $47 million 
for the average of all banks. The average chain had 3.9 banks in it. 
Illinois is presently the only unit banking state in the Seventh 
District. Fifty-nine percent of all chain banks in the District were 
in Illinois, where they numbered about 20 percent of all banks, and 
held 14.6 percent of total commercial bank deposits. The average chain 
TABLE I 
NUMBER AND DEPOSITS OF CHAIN BANKS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL BANKS, 1939-1962 
United States 
Oklahoma 
Number of Banks in Chains 











Deposits of Banks· in Chains 









Source: Darnell, Jerome C., 11 Chain Banking Development in the United States, 11 Bankers Maaazine, Vol. 153 
(Winter, 1970), p. 43. Compiled from various FR Bulletins, FDIC Reports, Banking and Monetary 
Statistics. 
* Darnell's computations. 
N 
0 
in ·Illinois contained 4.9 banks. Keating concluded that chain banking 
in Illinois appeared to be a direct attempt by bankers to circumvent 
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the prohibition of multiple-office banking by Illinois law. He further 
stated that, 11 In states that currently prohibit or limit multibank 
holding companies or branch banking, chain banking orga~izations provide 
a viable method of multi-office bank expansion" [26, p. 15]. 
The Comparative Performance of Multiple-Office 
Banking and Unit Banking -
A large body of evidence exists on the relative performance 
characteristics of branch banks, multi-bank holding company (MBHC) 
banks, and unit banks. While discrepancies in the evidence exist, a 
general consensus has emerged concerning many of the relationships 
addressed in the present research. 
Risk Effects and Portfolio Composition 
Empirical research has produced substantial support for the 
hypothesis that multi-office banks have riskier asset portfolios. 
Horvitz and Shull [22] and Fraser [17] found that branch banks tend 
to have higher loan-to-asset ratios than unit banks and higher propor-
tions of retail-type loans with longer maturities at lower interest 
rates. Moreover, loans-to-assets ratios are higher at unit banks in 
branching states than at unit banks in unit states. Many investigators 
found MHBC affiliates to have significantly higher loan-to-asset ratios 
than independe~t banks [21] [24] [29] [30] [45], to hold significantly 
lower cash balances [24] [32], to hold significantly more municipal 
bonds [29] (32] [33] [34] [41], and to hold significantly lower amounts 
of U. S. Government securities [24] [31] [32] [33]. 
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Numerous analyses have shown that MBHC affiliation has an important 
impact on the loan-portfolio composition of those banks. Curry [7] 
found that MBHC affiliated banks tend to make more of all types of loans 
except farm loans, while Fraser [17] reported that branch banks devote 
a much larger fraction of their resources to real estate lending. 
Overall, the evidence is inconclusive with respect to the impact of 
affiliation upon the choice among types of loans made. However, it is 
reasonable to conclude that multiple-office system banks are more risk-
oriented than comparable unit banks. The finding that multiple-office 
system banks hold proportionately more loans than unit banks indicates 
that the affiliated banks probably also extend more credit to their 
local communities. 
Capital Structure 
Empirical results on capital structure have been quite consistent. 
Several studies found that MBHC subsidiaries operate .with lower ratios 
of total capital to total assets [23] [32] [33] and of equity capital 
to total assets than comparable unit banks [16] [19] [23]. Fraser [17] 
found no significant difference between branch banks and independent 
banks on this point, however. The writers who found negative differences 
in capital structure attributed the difference to the lower risk of the 
diversified firms and the readier access to funds provided by the 
holding company structure. 
Operational Efficiency 
Early studies by Benston [4], Lawrence [29], and Ware [49] all 
located evidence of higher expense ratios for affiliated banks, with 
slight economies of scale. Two recent studies by Mayne [32] and 
Drum [13] refute these findings. Drum found slightly higher costs at 
branch banks than unit banks, but found no empirical justification for 
the proposition that MBHC affiliation produces economies of scale 
unavailable to independent banks. Horvitz and Shull [22] found branch 
bank costs to be slightly higher than unit bank costs. 
Rates and Prices 
The evidence on service fees is quite uniform. Horvitz and Shull 
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[22], Lawrence [29], Johnson and Meinster [24], Mayne [32], and Fraser 
[17] all report evidence which indicates multiple-office banks charge 
higher service fees relative to deposits. To the contrary, the evidence 
on interest rates paid on liabilities and received on assets is 
decidedly mixed. Horvitz and Shull [22] identified higher rates being 
paid and received by branch banks, while Fraser [17] found no differ-
ences. Johnson and Meinster [24] found interest rates paid by MBHC 
banks were lower than those paid by unit banks. Lawrence [29] found 
no differences in rates paid or received between the two groups. 
Probability 
The impact of multiple-office association upon overall profit-
ability is vague. Conceptual problems exist with the accurate measure-
ment of subsidiary bank profitability. The roles of parent and 
svbsidiary bank capital and debt may be ambiguous due to "double 
• 
leverage". Furthermore, the expense-generating methods employed to 
transfer income within a multiple-office organization may obscure 
profitability. This makes it necessary to consider the differences 
(between the two systems) in Other Operating Expenses which is the 
account in which fees paid to the parent would be recorded for services 
rendered to the affiliate. Lawrence [29] and Mayne [32] both found 
significantly higher ratios for MBHC banks, but Mayne also found lower 
Total Operating Expenses which implies positive economies of scale for 
MBHC banks. 
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The evidence on overall profitability is also mixed. Horvitz and 
Shull [22] found the ratio of Net Income to Total Assets to be lower 
for branch banks, yet they found Net Income to Total Capital to be 
higher. Fraser [17] found no differences in Net Income to Total Assets, 
but reported negative results on Net Income to Total Capital. 
Lawrence [29] found no differences in either measure, while Mayne [32] 
found positive differences on both measures. Mingo 1 s [34] results 
corroborate Mayne 1 s findings while Light 1 s [31] refute them. 
Summary 
Prior research has provided substantial evidence of several 
significant differences between multiple-office banks and unit banks 
{refer to Table II for a summary of some of this evidence). Multiple-
office banks have been shown to operate with fewer cash assets relative 
to total assets than unit banks and to make more loans proportionately. 
However, multiple-office bankers have not shown clear preferences for 
any particular types of loans relative to unit bankers. Multiple-office 
·banks do hold higher proportion of municipal bonds and lower proportions 
of U. S. Government securities. 
The evidence suggests that multiple-office banks operate with 
lower capital and equity bases, but that they tend to incur higher 
expense ratios. While multiple-office banks most frequently employ 
higher service charges, they exhibit no clear patterns with respect to 
interest rates charged or paid. Likewise, no clear evidence has been 
TABLE II 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR MULTIPLE-OFFICE VERSUS 
UNIT BANKS: RESULTS OF FIVE MAJOR STUDIES 
Horvitz Johnson & 
& Shull Lawrence Meinster . Mayne 
Performance Measure (1964) . (1967) (1975} (1977} 
Cash Assets/Total Ass~ts 
Municipals/Total Assets + + + 
Total Loans/Total Assets + + + 
Consumer Loans/Total Assets + 
Mortgages/Total Assets ND + 
Business Loans/Total Assets ND -
Total Capital/Total Assets ND 
Net Income per Employee 
Labor Costs/Total Assets ND 
Other Operating Expenses/TA + + 
Total Operating Expenses/TA + 
Service Charges/Deposits + + + + 
Interest, Fees/Loans + ND -
Interest Paid/Deposits + -
Total Revenue/Total Assets 
Net Income/Total Assets - NO + 
Net Income/Total Capital + ND + 


















Notes: Statistical methods used are (1) Bivariate Correlation, Multiple Regression; (2) "t" tests; 
(3) Multiple Discriminate Analysis; (4) Multiple Regression; and (5) Cluster Analysis. 
ND indicates no statistical difference was found; a blank space indicates the variable was not 
tested; a positive sign indicates that multiple-office banks exhibited higher values than unit 
banks for this measure; and a negative sign indicates that multiple-office banks exhibited lower 
values than unit banks for this measure. 
N 
U1 
found to indicate that multiple-office banks enjoy economy of scale 




An Operational Definition of a Chain Bank 
The term "chain bank" lacks a generally accepted definition which 
is sufficiently precise for a rigorous analysis. Darnell [8] defined 
chain banking as follows: 
A chain system was deemed to exist when two or more banks 
have one or more stockholders in common (excluding banks 
controlled by registered bank holding companies) provided 
that: (1) the stockholder(s) in common is among the 20 
largest stockholders in each bank, (2) the stockholder(s) 
in common is a director or an officer in each bank, and 
(3) if the stockholder(s) in common is not a director or 
an officer, he owns 5 percent or more of the stock in the 
bank in which he is not a director or officer. This 
definition does not specify that two or more banks must be 
1 controlled 1 by an individual or group of individuals . 
Instead, the basic assumption underlying the definition 
is that banks with common owners satisfying the three 
stated conditions have the potential capability of 
coordinating operating policies and are therefore considered 
chain banks (p. 308). 
Bank ownership is not a matter of public record. Therefore, 
Darnell 1 s definition cannot be utilized in tact. More recently, 
Keating [25, p. 15] defined chain banking as, 11 ••• the control of 
two or more commercial banks by the same individual or group of indi-
viduals." Unfortunately, Keating did not address the problem of 
determining when "control" exists. In the present study, a chain bank 
is deemed to exist when control over two or more independently operated 
unit banks is exercised by one individual or group of individuals. 
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Control is defined as the case where two or more banks have common 
directors or officers. 
Restricting the definition to instances in which common directors 
or officers are observed results in the loss of the case of the silent 
stockholder who owns a significant investment interest i.n two or more 
banks but does not participate in management by holding office. Thus 
the restriction shifts the emphasis from that of potential control as 
specified by Darnell [8], to that of actual influence exercised upon 
operating policies. 
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Most banks are closely held, frequently within families. A silent 
stockholder who holds a significant amount of stock probably is related 
to some other stockholder who is exercising managerial influence, and 
the chain would be reflected in the data through that person's presence. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that the analysis will not be 
seriously affected because the potential number of missed chains is 
very small. Furthermore, the identification procedure involved a 
cross-checking procedure which should mitigate problems associated 
with a more strict definition of a chain. 
Identification of the Chain 
Banks in Oklahoma 
Given the above definition of chain banking, identification of a 
complete list of all banks in the state which share common directors 
and/or officers became a simple, two-part problem. First, using a 
computer, an alphabetical list of all names of bank officers and 
directors was constructed from the Oklahoma Bank Directory [36], 
distributed by the Oklahoma Bankers Association. Since the Directory 
lists all officers/directors by bank, a person's name appeared once for 
each position held. Thus, on the computerized list, the name of.an 
individual who sat on the boards of three banks, for example, appeared 
three times. 
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The second part of the identification task was to establish a list 
of chain banks by utilizing information from sources within the banking 
industry. Certain bank officers are in a position to know about chain 
bank relationships among banks they are doing business with. Contact 
with some of those bankers resulted in a state-wide list of chains 
based upon industry sources. That list was then reconciled with the 
computer-constructed list to obtain a relatively error-free picture of 
chain associations within Oklahoma. 
For this research, chain-bank lists were developed for the years 
of 1979, 1977, and 1975. The computer-generated lists contained an 
upward bias of 10-15 percent. For example, in 1979, the computer 
identified 234 chain banks. Twenty banks were falsely identified as 
chain banks, while nine chain banks were identified as units. The 
reconciled list for 1979 is considered to have minimal errors. However, 
the error widens somewhat in the earlier years because no records are 
kept of chain affiliation and disaffilication, and the memories of 
knowledgeable individuals quickly become unreliable, forcing more 
reliance on the computer-constructed lists. Even so, the lists for 
· 1977 and 1975 are believed to be reliable, with the total error rate 
remaining low. 
The Population 
All commercial banks in the state were a part of this study. Bank 
size ranged from less than two million dollars of total assets to over 
1.4 billion dollars. Table III shows.all banks classified by the amount 
of total assets held. 
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. TABLE I II 
ALL BANKS IN OKLAHOMA BY TOTAL ASSETS 
Total Assets Number of Banks 
(OOO's $) 1975 1977 1979 
0- 10,000 218 194 155 
10,001- 25,000 150 148 148 
25,001- 50,000 57 82 108 
50,001- 100,000 27 38 53 
100,001- 500,000 6 10 20 
500,001-1,000,000 4 2 1 
>1,000,000 0 2 4 
Totals 462 476 489 
Table IV presents the number of banks in the state in each year 






















The number of banks is greatest in counties of moderate population 
levels, as seen in Table V. That clu?tering, however, is merely a 
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reflection of the large number of counties having moderate population. 
TABLE V 
ALL BANKS IN OKLAHOMA BY COUNTY POPULATION 
County Population Number of Banks 
(OOO's) 1975 1977 1979 
0- 5.0 6 9 8 
5.1- 10.0 51 52 52 
10.1- 25.0 122 117 ·120 
25.1- 50.0 154 149 135 
50.1-100.0 39 44 63 
100.1-400.0 11 20 22 
400.1-500.0 34 39 40 
>500 45 46 49 
Total 462 476 489 
In Table V, the population groupings are arranged so that all banks 
in the 400.1-500.0 bracket are in Tulsa County and all banks in the 
>500 bracket are in Oklahoma County. 
The Data 
The data for the study were obtained from the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. They consist of Statement of Condition and 
Income Statement information from all commercial banks in Oklahoma. 
A trade-off arose between the desirability of having the study 
encompass a wide time span and the tendency of the chain identification 
error rate to increase in earlier years. Therefore, the years of 1979, 
1977, and 1975 were chosen for study. The FRS data were complete except 
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for the omission of Total Loans, and Salaries + Benefits data for all 
banks in year 1975. The impact of those omissions was that the variables 
v3, Y9, and v13 could not be used for 1975. 
Performance Measures 
The performance of the two banking systems under scrutiny, unit 
versus chain, can be measured by using financial ratios. The appro-
priate ratios have been prescribed by the theory developed in Chapter 
II. They are listed in Table VI below, along with a sign indicating 
the direction in which chain bank performance is expected to differ 
from unit bank performance. 
There are several limitations to the use and interpretation of 
the financial ratios as performance measures. As always is true when 
ratios are used, they are meaningless without a norm for comparison. 
In this research, the adequacy of performance of either system was not 
in question. The ratios were being used only to compare one system 
against the other. 
Nor was the total explanatory power of the models at issue, since 
the determinants of bank performance were not being sought. The models 
attempted to hold constant the major forces which influence bank 
behavior so that the impact of chain association could be observed. 
·They were not designed to separate those forces which do influence bank 
behavior from those which do not. 
There were no lead or lag effects taken into account, and perhaps 
most important of all, there was no feasible way to include considera-
tion of the length of time from chain entry or exit by a bank. No 
records are available to indicate when a bank affiliates or disaffiliates 
with a chain and therefore it is not P.Ossible to examine the effects of 
Performance Category 
Portfolio Composition 
Capital and Lfabil ity 
Structure 
Operational Efficiency 













THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Performance Measure 
(Cash assets, U. S. Government Securities, 
Federal Funds Sold)/Total Assets 
Municipal Securities/Total Assets 
Total Loans/Total Assets 
Consumer Loans/Total Assets 
Residential Mortgages/Total Assets 
Commercial and Industrial Loans/Total Assets 
p: Common stock, preferred stock, surpluses, undivided profits, 
contingency reserves, loan and valuation reserves, capital 
notes and debentures)/Total Assets 
Net Income/Number of Employees 









Other Operating Expenses/Total Assets 
Total Operating Expenses/Total Assets 
Interest on Time Deposits/Total Deposits 
Total Interest and Fees/Total Loans 
Service Charges/Deposits 
Total Revenue/Total Assets 
Net Income/Total Assets 
Net Income/E common stock, preferred stock surpluses, undivided 
profits, contingency reserves, loan and valuation reserves, 
capital notes and debentures 


















chain membership on a bank across time. Clearly, it takes time for new 
strategies arising from a change in status to become effective and 
show up in a bank's performance ratios. At the present, those effects 
cannot be isolated and tested. 
Statistical Analysis 
Two approaches were employed to test the hypotheses of this study .. 
First, since all population parameters were known, direct comparison 
of the parameters of the two subpopulations, chain banks and unit 
banks, was possible. A qualitative guideline of performance difference 
was logically determined and the parameters were compared to it to 
detect if substantial operating differences existed between the two 
groups. 1 
Second, three statistical tests were applied to the data to observe 
what results would have been obtained had the data occurred as random 
samples of larger populations. T-tests were used to determine the 
equality of sample group means. Multiple regression was used with each 
performance ratio serving as a dependent variable to be regressed on 
seven independent variables which influence bank performance. By 
including chain bank affiliation in the regression equation as an 
independent variable, its effects upon bank performance can be examined, 
when the other influences are held constant. If the coefficient of 
the chain bank variable is statistically significant, the sign will 
indicate the direction in which chain bank performance differs from 
unit bank performance. The regression results should corroborate those 
from the t-tests. 
1The establishment of the guideline is discussed in Chapter VI. 
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Moreover, most prior studies of multiple-office bank performance 
have utilized these two procedures, and using them here will facilitate 
comparison of the results from this research with those from earlier 
work. 
Finally, the question of whether chain bank performance differs 
from unit bank performance is fundamentally a classification problem. 
Multiple discriminate analysis (MDA) seems well suited, conceptually, 
to the problem. Furthermore, MDA has the advantage of being a multi-
variate test, while the other two are univariate techniques. Thus, any 
interactive effects among the variables will be captured by MDA and 
brought to bear on the question. Therefore, the data were analyzed 
with MDA also. 
The t-tests 
The null hypothesis tested for each variable was H0: µ1 = µ2. 
The test statistic was: 
- -
t = 
xl - x2 
(6) 
ex1 - x2 
where xn was a mean and oxl - x2 is an estimate of the standard error 
of the difference between the means. A significance level of .05 was 
considered significant. 
Multiple Regression 
The hypotheses were tested with OLS linear multiple regression. 
The dependent variables were ratios formed from accounting statement 
data of the sample banks. A separate regression was estimated for each 
dependent variable. The dependent variables were defined in Table VI. 
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The general regression equation was specified as follows: 
(7) 
f35S. + f37D. + µ. 
J J J 
where Yjk was the kth performance variable of the jth bank in the ;th 
market. 
CB. was a binary variable which denoted if a bank belonged to a 
J 
chain. The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of 
this variable were the central items of concern in this study. Evidence 
that chain bank membership substantially affected bank performance 
appeared when the coefficient of this variable was significant and the 
sign was in the expected direction. CB = 1 if the observed bank was 
part of a chain; otherwise, CB = 0. 
I. represented economic influences of the local area whith impact 
1 
banking activity. Per capita income of the county was taken as a proxy 
of the overall effects of a wide range of factors. 
CHj was a binary variable which denoted the type of charter a bank 
held. If the bank was a national bank, CH= l; othervlise, CH= 0. 
Pj was the population of the county (in thousands) in which the 
bank was located. 
CN. 
1 
was a measure of competition facing a bank. It was expressed 
Herfindahl Index, H, 2 where Si = market share of as a such that H =rs;, 
bank i, based on total deposits in the local market area. The range of 
H is 0 < H < 1. As H rises, the degree of concentration within a market 
. d 2 increase . 
2Theory suggests that the lower the degree of concentration within 
a market, the greater the level of competition is likely to be. However, 
S. was the logrithm of the bank's assets. 
J. 
Dj was the straight-line distance in miles to the nearest large 
metropolitan area having two or more banks large enough to have an 
influence beyond just their own county. More specifically, D was the 
distance to the nearest of five cities: Oklahoma City or Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; Wichita, Kansas; Amarillo or Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas. The 
closer a bank was located to the big banks in those cities, the more 
likely it was to face direct competition from them in addition to 
competition from other local banks. 
µj represented the error factor in the regression equation. 
The independent variables are summarized and named in Table VII. 
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The assumptions of OLS multiple regression models are described in 
standard statistics texts. 3 Briefly stated, they are: 
1. The sample is randomly drawn. 
2. Each array of Y for a given combination of X's follows the 
normal distribution. 
3. The regression of Y on X's is linear. 
4. All the Y distributions have the same variance. 
Since this research utilizes data from the entire population under 
study, the assumption of the sample being randomly drawn does not apply. 
No inference about chain banking outside Oklahoma can be drawn. 
theory is not specific on the most appropriate measure to discern the 
level of concentration existing in a market, e.g., the number of firms, 
size dispersion, or dominance of the largest few. In recent banking 
studies, the Herfindahl Index has been the most commonly used proxy for 
the degree of competition present in a market. However, the important 
point is that regardless of the measure employed, the concentration proxy 
has been significantly related to performance about 80 percent of the 
time [40]. 
3For example, see Social Statistics, Chapter 17, by Hubert N. 
Blaylock, Jr., or Applied Regression Analysis, Chapter 1, by Norman 
Draper and Harry Smith. 
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The assumption of normali.ty of the dependent variables is critical 
- . 
. only when N is small, due to the Central Limit Theorem [5]. In this 
research, N > 460 for all variables in all three years, and therefore, 
the normality assumption can be relaxed. 
TABLE VII 

























Herfindahl Index number 
Binary variable = 0 if unit bank; 1 if 
chain bank 
· Per capita income of county in which Bank 
j is located, in thousands 
Binary variable = 0 if state bank; 1 if 
national bank 
Population of county in which Bank j is 
located, in thousands 
Straight-line mileage from.Bank j to 
nearest metropolitan area 
Natural logarithm of the total assets of 
Bank j 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
MDA is a statistical technique which assigns observations to one or 
two (or more) predetermined groups, given a set of characteristics for 
each group. The discriminating variables are used to derive a set of 
coefficients, or weights, for each variable. The resulting function 
produces a score for each observation which can be compared to some 
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critical value and the observation then assigned to a group. In the 
discriminant function: 
Z1. = b0 + b1X11. + . . • + b .X .. + . . . + b X . J Jl n ni (8) 
Zi is the·discriminant score for observation i, bj is the classi-
fication function coefficient, or weight, for variable X. 1., and X .. is . J Jl 
the jth discriminating variable in the ;th observatio~. 
If the theory presented in this paper is correct, and chain banks 
do perform differently from unit banks, then Multiple Discriminant 
Analysis should be able to classify each bank correctly and assign it 
to its respective group on the basis of the same variables4 used in the 
regression analysis. Those variables have already been theoretically 
justified as the.ones which will affect, or be affected by chain bank 
membership. 
The Assumption of Multivariate Normality. MDA assumes the 
discriminating variables have multivariate normal distributions. 
Violation of that assumption may have several undesirable consequences. 
According to Pinches [39]: 
... the presence of multivariate non-normality indicates 
that (1) error rates are generally affected for both the 
linear and quadratic discriminant functions; (2) the quadra-
tic is affected even more than the linear; and (3) correla-
tion among the predictor variables may substantially 
influence classification results. The magnitude and 
direction of the impact is, in general, unknown (p. 433). 
Presently, there are no procedures available which test the distri-
butions of variables in discriminant problems for multivariable 
4In MDA, the Yk's shed the dependency status which they possess in 
regression analysis, and become predictor variables along with independ-
dent regression variables. Thus, the Yk designation in MDA· is merely a 
variable name. 
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normality [14] [39]. Various strategies have been employed by 
researchers when confronted with uncertainty about the distributions 
of their variables. The most common approach has been to assume 
normality of the data [14] [39]. In this study, there is no.basis for 
such an assumption. Indeed, the opposite assumption seems more likely 
to be true. 
Attempts have been made in the past to compensate for the lack of 
a test for multivariate normality by testing all variables for uni-
variate normality. However, that procedure will not ensure multivariate 
normality since all the variables can have univariate normal distribu-
tions withou the data being multivariate normal [39]. 
Another strategy often employed has been to assume that the MDA 
classification procedures are robust to non-normality [14] [39]. 
Controversy exists in the literature about that approach. Lachenbruch, 
Sneeringer, and Reva [28] examined the robustness of both linear and 
quadratic procedures against three nonmultivariate normal distributions 
having known classification errors. They concluded that the standard 
procedures may be quite sensitive to nonmultivariate normality. On the 
other hand, Klecka [27] states, 
The statistical theory of discriminant analysis assumes that 
the discriminating variables have a multivariate normal 
distribution and that they have equal variance-covariance 
matrices within each group. In practice, the technique is 
very robust and these assumptions need not be strongly 
adhered to (p. 435). 
To escape from that difficulty, a commonly used strategy has been 
to perform various transformations upon the data prior to estimating 
the discriminant function. The natural log transformation has been 
used frequently because it does make the distribution.more symmetric 
and probably more normal [14]. However, the transformation may also 
alter both the relationships among the variables and the relative 
positions of the observations [14]. 
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The procedure utilized in this research followed the recommendations 
of Pinches [39], and Lachenbruch, Sneeringer, and Revo [28]. · They 
suggested that the original data be used to test for equality of group 
dispersion matrices, then the discriminant functions estimated, and 
the error rates observed, followed by retesting after transforming the 
data, to detennine if discriminatory power was increased. 
A Priori Probabilities. Standard discriminant analysis classifi-
cation rules incorporate a priori probabilities to account for the 
probability of an observation actually arising from each of the groups 
in the population. Eisenbeis [14] has shown that mis-statement of the 
prior probabilities can cause the classification error to increase 
quite substantially. 
Because a universe is under consideration in the present research, 
a priori probabilities are known, provided the initial classifications 
are correct. As previously described, all banks have been classified 
by two methods, and the results then reconciled. The 1979 classifica-
tions are believed to be error free, and those of prior years to be 
nearly so. 
Classification Procedures and Error Rates. Initially, all 
variables, both dependent and independent (except for the chain bank 
dummy) were used.· However, correlation among the variables reduces 
the discriminatory power of the MDA model [14], and it was apparent 
that several of the bank performance measures must be correlated. For 
example, an increase in the total loans to total assets ratio must be 
accompanied by increases in one or more of the ratios of loan 
sub-categories. Five different step-wise procedures were used, 
. attempting to locate the optimal set of variables, with identical 
results. The step-wise procedures all performed less well than the 
direct method of using all variables at once. 
Each time a classification analysis was run, Box's M was calcu-
lated to test for equality of the covariance matrices. In all cases, 
the null hypothesis of equal covariance matrices was rejected at an 
extremely high level of confidence (>.9999), indicating that quadratic 
classification rules should be employed. 
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The term, 11 error rate, 11 is used to denote the classification 
accuracy of the model. There are methods for estimating the expected 
population error rate which do not depend upon normality of the data. 
They are: (1) the resubstitution method, (2) the holdout or split 
sample method, and (3) the Lachenbruch Q method. It has been well 
documented [39] that the resubstitution and the holdout methods produce 
biased estimated of the actual error rate, while the U method produces 
results which are relatively free of bias. 
The Lachenbruch U method was chosen for use in this study, although 
the choice involved a trade-off. The only computer package presently 
available which includes the U method provides for linear classification 
rules only. Thus, in order to utilize the most accurate test, it was 
·necessary to accept theoretically less desirable classification rules 
in the test procedure. To compensate for the trade-off, linear rules 
were used to analyze the data, and the results were compared to those 
from the quadr~tic procedure to locate any large differences between 
the two methods. Close similarity of the classification results from 
all three procedures could serve to validate the U method results. That 
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procedure seemed preferable to the alternative of using a test which is 
known to produce estimates having an unpredictable amount of bias. 
Also useful in assessing the classification efficiency of the model 
is a test employed by Joy and Tollefson [25]. The test statistic used 
was: 
-
z = y - 7f 
[ (1 N n) ]! 
(9) 
where y is the proportion of observations correctly classified by the 
discriminant model and n is the probability of classification by chance. 5 
The Z-score measures the likelihood of the correct classification 
occurring by chance, and it can be evaluated against a normal distribu-
ti on. 
Interpretation of the Significance of the Individual Variables. 
The interpretation of the output of MDA is somewhat more difficult than 
that of multiple regression because of the nature of the discriminant 
function coefficients. The coefficients are not unique, only their 
ratios are [14]. That property makes it impossible to establish levels 
of significance for the coefficients. Eisenbeis [14] points out that: 
5rf the classification matrix is constructed as follows 
Classified GrouQ MembershiQ 
Actual Group Membership Group 1 Group 2 Total 
Group 1 A B c 
Group 2 D E F -
Total G H N 
then, y = (A + E) 7 N; and n = F . N. 
... it is not possible, nor does it make any sense to test, 
as in the case with regression analysis, whether a particular 
discriminant function coefficient is equal to zero or any 
other value. That is, there is no test for the absolute 
value of a particular variable (p. 883). 
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Moreover, the relative magnitudes of the weights cannot be compared 
because of different units of measure (e.g., dollars versus miles) [35]. 
Therefore, variables in MDA are standardized by their standard devia-
tions. Once standardized, the magnitudes of the absolute values of the 
standardized canonical correlation coefficients can be compared to 
determine which variables contribute the most to definitions of the 
composite function [27] [35] [38] [46]. 
The unstandardized classification function coefficients do provide 
information about the association between the observations being scored 
and the discriminating variables. The size and sign of the bj 1 s in 
Equation (8) determine the effects of the discriminating performance 
measures, the Xj 1 s [35]. If bj increases (positively or negatively), 
Zi increases and moves toward reassignment from the unit bank group to 
the chain bank group [35]. Thus, it was possible to determine the 
influence of chain bank association upon the performance variables of 
a bank by examining the differences in the classification coefficients 
of the two groups. For example, the coefficients for the variable Y1 
(Total Cash Assets~ Total Assets) in the year 1979 were 517.4 and 515.4 
for unit banks and chain banks respectively. The conclusion drawn was 
that chain banks held lower proportions of cash assets than unit banks 
during that period. 
Because there is no test for significance of the individual vari-
ables, significance can only be inferred from the differences of group 
means, which is tested by the use of Wilk 1 s lambda statistic [27]. 
Lambda is an inverse measure of the discriminating power of the original 
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variables which has not yet been removed by the discriminating function 
. [27]. The larger the value of lambda, the less information remaining 
[27]. Lambda is evaluated by a chi-square statistic. 
To summarize the interpretive procedure of the MDA output used in 
the research, the steps were these: 
1. The significance levels of the differences between the group 
means were established by the chi-squared statistic from 
Wilk's /.. [27]. 
2. The absolute values of the standardized canonical discriminant 
function coefficients were examined to determine which were 
the most important variables in discriminating between groups. 
A coefficient value lying above the median was considered to 
be important. 
3. When a performance variable was located whose value was above 
the median in at least two years having significant x2 values, 
its classification function coefficients were examined to 
determine the direction of the difference between unit banks 
and chain banks. From those differences, a profile of chain 
banks versus unit banks was drawn. 
CHAPTER V 
THE NATURE OF CHAIN BANKING IN OKLAHOMA . 
Chain banking has experienced substantial growth in Oklahoma, both 
absolutely and relative to unit banking, since Darnell's study in 1962 
[8]. Table ~III presents the number and percentages of Oklahoma banks, 
classified by unit and chain status. 
TABLE VIII 
NUMBER (%) OF UNIT AND CHAIN BANKS IN OKLAHOMA 
Year 1962* 1975 1977 1979 
Unit Banks 144 (64) 253 (55) 259 (54) 256 (52) 
Chain Banks 82 (36) 209 (45) 217 (46) 233 (48) 
Total Banks 226 462 476 489 
* Darnell [8], insured banks only. 
The use of figures from Darnell's work for comparative purposes 
in this research required consideration of three points. First, the 
definition of chain banking used by Darnell was somewhat different from 
the one upon which this research was based. To the extent that chain 
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bank associations exist through common directors who are not also 
owners, Darnell's definition is more restrictive than the one employed 
herein. 
Second, attention was previously called to the suspicious nature 
of Year 1945 data reported by Darnell [8], which is contained in Table I 
(page 20). That might cast some doubt (although probably only slightly) 
on his 1962 data as well. 
Third, Darnell dealt only with banks insured by FDIC, whereas all 
banks in the State were considered in the present study. 
Relying upon Darnell's data as the best available, the compound 
rate of growth (calculated from the data in Table VIII) of the number 
of chain banks during the period 1962-1979 was 6.34 percent, compared 
to 3.44 percent per year for unit banks. During the more recent years 
of 1975-1979, both growth rates have dropped off considerably, to 
2.2 percent per year for chain banks and 0.25 percent for unit banks, 
with the number of unit banks actually declining slightly from its peak 
in 1977. 
Table IX shows the proportions of assets held by chain banks rela-
tive to assets held by all Oklahoma banks. 
TABLE IX 
TOTAL ASSETS HELD BY CHAIN BANKS AS PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL ASSETS OF ALL BANKS IN OKLAHOMA 
1962* 1975 1977 1979 
% Chain Banks Assets 27.4 51.1 51.6 53.5 
* . 
Darnell [8], insured banks only. 
The rate of growth shown .by chain banks assets in Table IX was 
. 4.01 percent per year, somewhat lower than the growth rate of the 
number of chain banks seen in Table VIII. The lower rate is at least 
partially explained by the fact that new chain banks often are de nova 
banks. 
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On a wider scope, only one other study besides Darnell 1 s [8] is 
available for comparison. In 1977, Keating [26] examined chain banking 
practices in the Seventh FRS District. He found that in Illinois, the 
heaviest chain banking state in the District, only about 20 percent of 
all banks, holding about 14.6 percent of all banks assets, were chain 
affiliated. Those proportions were markedly different from those 
Darnell [8] reported for Illinois in 1962, when 11.3 percent of all 
insured banks held 30 percent of all insured bank assets. Thus it 
appears that in Illinois between 1962 and 1977, the number of chain 
banks nearly doubled while the assets they controlled dropped by one-
half. The reasons for the sharply devergent experience between the two 
states (Oklahoma and Illinois) cannot be ascertained in this research. 
However, the fact that while chain bank penetration was declining 
sharply in one state, it was growing steadily to become the dominant 
structure in another, makes it quite hazardous to draw generalized, 
global conclusions about the nature of chain banking. 
Another interesting sidelight (on which no recent evidence has been 
published) is that in 1962, in only one state (Rhode Island) did chain 
banks hold more than one-half of all insured bank assets. In Rhode 
Isalnd, three chain banks held 90 percent of all insured bank assets in 
1962 [8]. However, chain bank assets were in the 45-49.5 percent range 
in the states of Colorado, Florida, and Texas [8]. 
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Chain banks showed a definite preference for being state chartered. 
A classification of chain banks by type of charter is shown in Table X. 
TABLE X 
OKLAHOMA CHAIN BANKS BY CHARTER (%) 









Total 209 217 233 
Not only did chain banks prefer to be state chartered, they were 
widely dispersed throughout the state. Except for Oklahoma and Tulsa 
counties, the number of chain banks in a county was small. Table XI 
presents an enumeration of chain banks per county. 
TABLE XI 
NUMBER OF CHAIN BANKS PER COUNTY IN OKLAHOMA 
Number of Chain Banks in Each County 




1979 14 15 14 11 9 
1977 15 14 11 13 9 

















About one-fifth of Oklahoma's 77 counties had no chain banks, while 
about 52 percent had between 1-3 chain banks. Thus, about three-fourths 
of the counties had fewer than four chain banks in them. On the other 
hand, the state's two metropolitan counties contained about one-fourth 
of all the chain banks (but only about 18 percent of all banks) in 
Oklahoma. 
In Table XII, chain banks are classified by population of the 
counties in which they are located. 
TABLE XII 
CHAIN BANKS CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION (1979) 
























The heavy concentration of banks in counties having 10,000-50,000 
peopl~ reflects the average county population of about 30,000 in 1979. 
The 24 chain banks in the 400,001-500,000 category were all in Tulsa 
county, and all banks in the over 500,000 category were in Oklahoma 
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county. Thus, it appears that while chain banks were positioned to 
compete over most of the state, chain bank penetration intensified some-
what in the more populous counties. 
Even so, the number of banks in a chain tended to be very low. 
Table XIII shows the classification of chain banks by the number of 
banks within each chain. 
TABLE XIII 
NUMBER OF BANKS PER CHAIN 
Number of Banks Number of Cumulative 
in the Chain Chains Percentage 
2 52 . 47 
3 11 61 
4 6 72 
5 3 79 
6 1 82 
7 1 85 
8 2 92 
18 1 100 
About two-thirds of the chain organizations contained only two 
members although they accounted for only 47 percent of all chain banks. 
No other structural patterns within chains were discernable. There 
were chains in which all banks were large or all banks were small; 
chains in which the lead bank was large and the other(s) was(were) 
small and vice versa; chains in which all members were within a few 
miles of each other and chains with all members widely separated. The 
strategies observed were so diverse as to give the appearance of being 
more of less randomly drawn. The only generalization that could be 
inferred is that the chains tended to have only two or three members. 
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Taken altogether, the above data suggest that the profile of the 
typical chain bank is that of a small-to-medium sized, state-chartered 
bank in a town of less than 75,000 population, and the bank is 
associated with one other bank which could be located anywhere in the 
State. The small number of banks in the average chain was unanticipated 
since both Darnell [8] and Keating [26] reported the average chain to 
have 5-to-6 banks in it. Oklahoma bankers appear to prefer the chain 
structure, but only in a very limited fashion. 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARISONS OF POPULATIONS 
In this study, data from the entire population of all banks in 
Oklahoma were available for examination. Those data were divided into 
two sub-populations, unit banks and chain banks. Since all parameters 
of the two sub-populations were known, it was possible to make direct 
comparisons of the performance measures and other parameters of the 
two sets of banks. 
In any study in which population data are present, the conclusions 
drawn by the observer are the products of the interpretation which the 
observer places upon the information provided by the data. Obviously, 
observers having different perspectives of the data will arrive at 
different conclusions. Using the means of the two groups on the 
variable Total Assets as an example, one observer might conclude that 
the mean of the chain bank group of $45,239,000 was significantly and 
meaningfully greater than that of the unit bank group of $35,823,000. 
Not only is the difference of about $9,400,000 a large amount of money, 
but it is a difference of over 26 percent. Another observer, wishing 
to give more weight to the standard deviations, might note that in data 
which range up to·$1.4 billion, a difference of $9.4 million is quite 
small, and con~lude that the means really are not significantly 
different from each other. Thus, population data present knotty 
problems of interpretation for the researcher who is trying to arrive 
at objective conclusions about the topic under investigation. 
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In this study, generally, a meaningful difference was first deemed 
to exist when the group mean of the chain bank variable differed from 
the group mean of the unit bank variable by at least 10 percent in two 
of the three time periods, and/or the means were diverging as time 
passed. Then, the guideline was relaxed to 5 percent and any additional 
differences were noted. Whenever the standard deviations were large 
relative to the means, they were also considered. It must be recognized 
that these guidelines may not be the appropriate ones in each case. 
However, they have the advantage of providing a uniform standard and of 
reducing the number of necessary decisions to a minimum. 
Table XIV presents the group means and standard deviations of all 
variables, along with the percentage by which the chain bank means 
. 1 
differed from those of the unit banks. The variable~ which exhibited 
meaningful differences are discussed below. 
Total Assets 
Bank size, as measured by Total Assets appeared to be substantially 
larger for the average chain bank by about 26 percent in all three 
years. However, the total asset values of the four largest banks in 
the State caused the distributions to be severely skewed to the right. 
The variable's range extended from $1 million to over $1.4 billion, 
which produced standard deviations roughly three times the size of 
their respective means. Because the first and third largest banks 
(having combined assets of $2.36 billion in 1979) are chain banks and 
the second and fourth ranked banks are units (having combined assets of 
$2.09 billion in 1979), the impact of those outliers on the statistical 
measures is largely offsetting. Therefore, it appears likely that the 
Variable Year 
































GROUP MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ALL 
PERFORMANCE AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
Means x -X c . u Standard Deviations 
Unit Chain Xu Unit Chain 
$35,823 $45,239 .2628 $115,304 $137,626 
28,223 35,906 .2722 91,199 109,520 
22,816 28,845 .2642 73,936 87,913 
.2633 .2387 -.0934 .140 .110 
.2641 .2443 -.0750 .141 .114 
.2681 .2510 -.0638 .139 .115 
.3298 .2837 -.1398 .145 .128 
.3262 .2945 -.0972 .139 .134 
.3331 .3132 -.0597 .145 .128 
.1185 .1354 .1426 .081 .086 
.1218 .1352 .1100 .090 .089 
.1435 .1469 .0237 .093 .. 093 
.5032 .5288 .0509 .118 .107 
.5068 .5266 .0312 .122 .117 
.1603 .1658 .0299 .085 .087 
.1529 .1589 .0392 .084 .091 
.1345 .• 1402 .0424 .076 .082 
.1290 .1434 .1116 .081 .080 
.1167 .1251 .0720 .075 .224 
.0886 .0906 .0226 .059 • 728 
.1033 .1296 .2546 .609 .083 
.1051 .1261 .1998 .080 .090 
.0957 .1160 .2121 .075 .091 
.0945 .0903 -.0444 .051 .042 
.0898 .0906 .0089 .050 .041 
.0845 .0882 .0438 .029 .039 
13.58 13. 77 .0144 7.20 7.16 
9.07 9.60 .0580 5.13 5.46 
7.57 7.86 .0384 4.40 4.74 
.0168 .0154 -.0833 .006 .005 
.0159 .0150 -.0566 .005 .005 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
...... 
Means x -X Standard Deviation c u 
Variable Year Unit Chain . . . . . . - - -Xu Unit Chain 
ylO 1979 .0099 .0105 .0606 • 004" .005 
1977 .0089 .0099 .1124 .004 .005 
1975 .0084 .0091 .0833 .004 .004 
y 11 1979 .0685 .0716 .0453 .014 .015 
1977 .0599 .0615 .0267 .012 .013 
1975 .0569 .0586 .0299 .012 .013 
y12 1979 .0634 .0657 .0363 . 013 .012 
1977 .0522 .0527 .096 .009 .008 
1975 .0516 .0531 .0291 .009 .009 
y13 1979 .1054 .1106 .0493 .020 .018 
1977 .0906 .0915 .0099 .014 -. 016 
y14 1979 .0036 .0041 .1389 .004 .004 
1977 .0029 .0033 .1379 .003 .003 
1975 .0030 • 0033 .1000 .003 .003 
y15 1979 .0857 • 0879 - .0257 .013 .014 
1977 .0721 .0734 .0180 .011 .011 
1975 .0694 .0704 .0144 .010 .011 
y16 1979 .0142 .0140 .0141 .007 .006 
1977 .0113 .0122 .0796 .005 .006 
1975 .0110 . 0111 .0091 .005 .005 
y 17 1979 .1671 .1715 .0263 .094 .113 
1977 .1346 .1420 .0550 .063 .069 
1975 .1334 .1333 .0007 .056 .058 
INC 1979 6.75 6.75 .0002 1.61 1. 52 
(OOO's) 1977 6.04 6.09 .0089 1.26 1.35 
1975 4.93 4.94 .0023 1.10 1.10 
Popul 1979 96. 9 142.4 .4685 164.9 202.0 
(OOO's) 1977 95.6 136.2 .4251 162.7 197.4 
1975 87.7 133.6 .5237 153.9 195.9 
Dist 1979 62.0 49.2 -.2050 38.4 37.2 
(miles) 1977 61.2 50.6 -.1740 38.4 36.8 
1975 62.4 50.6 -.1890 37.9 36.6 
..... 
typical chain bank is larger than the typical unit bank, although they 
may not be quite as large as the means indicated. 
v1: Cash Assets to Total Assets Ratio 
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The proportion of Total Assets devoted to cash reserves by the 
average unit bank was relatively constant during 1975-1979, and was well 
above the corresponding figure for the average chain banks. Further-
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Figure 1. Ratio of Cash Assets to Total Assets 
Although the percentage of difference met the 10 percent 
standard in 1979 only, the gap widened by about 4 percentage points 
each year, and in the hypothesized direction. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that chain banks devoted less of their assets to 
cash reserves than did unit banks. 
,. ··. 
Y2: Municipal Securities to 
Total Assets Ratio 
Although both groups decreased their commitments to municipal 
securities during the period, chain bank asset proportions were 
consistently above those of unit banks, and the standard was exceeded 
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Figure 2. Ratio of Municipal Securities to 
Total Assets 
The reduction in portfolio commitments was inconsistent with 
expected behavior, but both groups acting in the same direction 
suggests that ~hey were responding in the same way to changes in the 
general economic environment, or to some other external disturbances. 
However, the difference between the groups widened in the expected 
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direction, thereby supporting the hypothesis that chain banks devote 
more resources to municipal securities. 
Y5: Residential Mortgage Loans to 
Total Assets Ratio 
Both groups of banks increased their commitment to residential 
mortgages by over 50 percent during 1975 to 1978. Chain banks moved 
up more sharply, widening the difference percentage from 2.26 percent 
to 11.16 percent. As was the case with Y1, only one year 1 s results 
(1979) exceeded the established standard of 10 percent, but because the 
trend was consistent and in the hypothesized direction, a conclusion 
that operating differences exist between chain banks and unit banks on 
this performance measure seemed warranted. 
Y6: Commercial and Industrial Loans 
to Total Assets Ratio 
While the fraction of Total Assets which both groups devoted to 
commercial loans was only in the 11-13 percent range, the percentage 
difference between the two groups was large. Figure 3 presents the 
data. 
v14 : Service Charges to Total Deposits Ratio 
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This measure produced clear evidence of an operating difference 
between the two groups. The percentage difference rose from 10 percent 
in 1975 to 13.9 percent in 1979. Those results were in line with 













Figure 3. Ratio of Commercial and Industrial 
Loans to Total Assets 
Population 
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The data indicated definitely that the average chain bank operated 
in a more heavily populated county than did the average unit bank, on 
the basis of the percentage difference between the group means. 
However, the means and standard deviations were badly affected by a 
right hand bi-modal distribution (see Table V, page 31) arising from a 
large number of banks, both units and chains, being located in the 
Oklahoma City and Tulsa areas. Nevertheless, the wide differences of 
around 45 percent. between the group means appears to be rather compelling 
evidence that chain banks tend to be located in more populous areas than 
unit banks do. 
Distance 
Substantial differences of group means were also found in the 
Distance variable. Mean differences ragned from -18.94 percent in 
1975, to -17.42 percent in 1977, to -20.53 percent in 1979, while 
standard deviations were stable, around 38. The average chain bank 
clearly appears to be closer to a metropolitan area than the average 
unit bank. 
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Summarizing the conclusions drawn from examining the parameters of 
the two sub-populations of chai~ and unit banks, strong evidence 
appeared which indicated that chain banks tend to be larger than unit 
banks, and that they also tend to be located in more populous counties, 
closer to a large metropolitan area. It al~o appears quite clear that 
chain banks place more of their funds into municipal securities and 
commercial loans than unit banks do, and that chain banks make higher 
service charges. Weaker evidence also appeared to indicate that chain 
banks place lower amounts of funds into liquid assets than unit banks 
do and also make more residential mortgage loans. Each of the con-
clusions about performance is in line with the stated hypotheses of 
this paper. 
Relaxation of the significant difference guideline from 10 percent 
to 5 percent causes the variables Y9 and Y10 to become significant. 
Those variables indicate that chain banks tend to pay lower salaries 
and benefits relative to total assets than unit banks do, and that 
chain banks also tend to incur higher Other Operating Expenses. Both 
conclusions are also in line with expectations. 
CHAPTER VI I 
THE STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF 
CHAIN BANKS AND UNIT BANKS IN OKLAHOMA 
Univariate t-tests 
Group means and standard deviations were calculated for all vari-
ables, and then t-tests were performed to determine if significant 
differences existed between the means .. Table XV presents the results 
for those variables in which significant differences between group means 
were indicated at the .05 significance level or lower in at least one 
year .. 
To be considered as evidence that the performance of chain banks 
was different from that of unit banks, t-tests which were statistically 
significant at the .05 level in at least two of the three years 
examined were required. On that basis, the t-tests indicated that chain 
banks tend to hold fewer liquid assets than unit banks do. The signifi-
cance levels were .012 and .000 for 1977 and 1979 respectively . 
. Furthermore, in 1975, the significance level of .112, while outside the 
specified range, was still reasonably good. 
The t-tests suggest that chain bankers place the funds, obtained 
by reducing liquid assets, into commercial loans. The significance 
levels for that variable were .010, .008, and .000 for 1975, 1977, and 
1979. · It also appears that chain banks incur higher Other Operating 
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TABLE XV 
GROUP MEANS WHICH PRODUCED T-VALUES SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE YEAR 
1975 1977 1979 
Significance Significance Significance 
Means Units Chains Level Units Chains Level Units Chains Level 
llerf Index .268 .251 .149 .264 .244 .091 .263 .239 • 031 
Cash Assets 
Tota 1 Assets .333 .313 .112 .326 .295 .012 .330 .284 .ODO 
' 
Munici12als 
Total Assets .144 .147 .699 .122 .135 .107 .119 .135 .026 
Total Loans 
Tota 1 Assets NA* NA NA .507 .526 .152 .503 .529 • 012 
Mort~ 
Tota 1 Assets .089 .091 • 728 .117 .125 .224 .129 .143 .049 
Coml Loans 
Total Loans .096 .116 .010 .105 .126 .008 .103 .130 .ODO 
Tot Sal + Bens 
TotaTAsset-s - NA NA NA .016 .015 .057 .017 .015 .003 
Other OQ~ 
Tota 1 Assets .008 .009 .043 .009 .010 .025 .010 .011 .162 
Tot oe Exe 
Total Assets .057 .059 .141 .060 .062 .171 .069 .072 .022 
Int on TD 
Time Oeps .052 .052 .072. .052 .053 .539 .063 .066 .039 
Tot Int + Fees 
Total Loans NA NA NA .091 .092 .548 .105 .111 .002 
Population 87.7 133.6 .206 95.6 136.2 .016 96.9 142.4 .007 
Distance 62.4 50.6 .001 61.2 50.6 .002 62.0 49.2 .ooo 
*NA indicates data missing from the FRS tapes. Q') w 
Expenses to Total Assets ratios than unit banks experience, as indi-
cated by significance levels of .043 in 1975 and .025 in 1977. 
County population was a significant factor in 1977 and 1979, at 
the level of .016 and .007, respectively, while distance from a large 
city was a highly significant influence in all three years with levels 
of .001 (1975), .002 (1977), .000 (1979). 
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The significance levels of several of the variables exhibited quite 
wide variation across time. For example, the significance level of the 
Municipals to Total Assets variable improved from .69 in 1975 to .107 
in 1977 to .026 in 1979. Mortgages to Total Assets shows the same 
pattern, going from .728 to .224 to .049 across the three periods 1975-
1979. The probable cause(s) of those wide variations might be changing 
economic or regulatory conditions, but a more plausable explanation 
seems likely to be the rising difficulty of correctly identifyi"ng the 
chain banks in earlier years. In 1979, 12 out of the 13 variables 
listed in Table XV were significant at the .05 level or better. In 
1977, only five variables fell into that range, and in 1975, the number 
of significant variables dropped to three. It seems doubtful that the 
differences between the two groups widened that dramatically in the 
span of five years. 
Summarizing the results from the t-tests, chain banks, relative to 
unit banks, tended to: 
1. Hold fewer liquid assets, 
2. Make proportionately more commercial loans, 
3. Incur higher Other Operating Expenses, 
4. Be located in more populous counties, and 
5. Be closer to major metropolitan areas. 
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Regression Analysis 
Multicollinearity and Auto-Correlation 
Careful searches were made for evidence of the presence of both 
auto-correlation and multicollinearity. The correlation matrices 
showed low-to-moderate correlation between most variables. The highest 
r found was r = .679 between Distance and Population, and Population 
showed r = .592 with Income. Each of three variables involved was 
dropped out of the equations in turn. The only consequential changes 
which occurred in the retests were declines in the R2 values and the 
F-ratios. The regression coefficient values showed no marked insta-
bility across the retests, and standard errors remained low and stable. 
Multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem. 
The usual test for auto-correlation is the Durbin-Watson d 
statistic. Tables of critical values of d in statistics texts only go 
as far as N = 100, k = 6. Therefore, it was necessary to estimate 
critical values by using a formula developed by Theil and Nager [47] 
which yields only the upper boundary. Values of d were calculated for 
the residuals from all equations in all three years. The results, 
along with the estimated critical values are given in Table XVI. 
Of all calculated values which fall below their appropriate critical 
upp~r values, only that of Y17 in 1979 is likely to be below the lower 
limit, indicating a clear rejection of the null hypothesis that p = 0 
at the .01 level of significance. The rest of the unfavorable calcu-
lated values probably fall within the indeterminant range. Therefore, 
auto-correlation did not appear to pose a problem to this research. 
TABLE XVI 
DURBIN WATSON d VALUES WITH ESTIMATED UPPER LIMIT CRITICAL 
VALUES AT THE .01 LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE 
yk 1975 1977 
1 1.750 1.898 
2 1.840 1.764 
3 --- 1.853 
4 1.946 1.989 
5 1. 793 1. 755 
6 1.091 1.917 
7 1.989 1.967 
8 1.817 1.783 
9 1.999 
10 2.119 2.133 
11 1.843 2.128 
12 1.977 2.198 
13 1.982 
14 1.848 1. 949 
15 1.982 2.028 
16 1.852 1.740 
17 1.894 1. 793 
Critical Value 1.810 1.813 





















All variables were te_sted for normality using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness of fit test [5]. The test results are displayed in 
Table XVII. The null hypothesis of normality was rejected at a very 
high level of confidence for all variables except one: v11 in 1979. 
After transforming all variables to log form, the tests were rerun. 
While the Z-scores for the most variables fell as a result of the 
transformation·s, normality was not achieved for most of them (see 
Table XVIII). 
TABLE XVII 
RESULTS OF KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS FOR NORMALITY OF ALL VARIABLES, 
BEFORE TRANSFORMATIONS, 1975-1979 
1975 1977 1979 
Si gnifi ca nee Significance Significance 
Variable K-S Z Level K-S Z Level K-S Z Level 
TO TALAS 8.187 .000 8.300 .000 8.394 .000 
HERF 3.233 .000 3.603 • 000 3.694 .000 
INCOME 3.333 .000 2.330 .000 3.056 .000 
POP UL 8.399 .000 8.415 .000 8.460 .000 
DIST 1.401 .039 1.516 .020 1.652 .009 
YI 1. 728 • 005 2.071 .000 2.072 .000 
Y2 l.268 .080 1.694 .006 1.446 .031 
Y3 1.981 .001 2.182 .000 
Y4 2.037 .000 1.861 .002 2.290 .000 
Y5 I. 793 .003 1.413 • 037 1. 593 .012 
Y6 2.234 .000 2.255 .ooo 2.117 .000 
Y7 4.817 .000 5.673 .000 6.026 .000 
YB 2.014 .001 1.480 • 025 1. 654 .000 
Y9 3.011 .000 2.797 .000 
YlO 3.025 .000 2.755 .000 2.644 .000 
Yll 1.561 .015 1.541 .017 1.019 .250 
Y12 3.784 .000 3.808 .000 2. ll5 .000 
Y13 2.388 .000 2.462 .000 
Y14 4.256 .ooo 4.780 .000 4.268 .000 
Y15 1.812 .003 2.018 .001 1.405 • 039 
Y16 1.446 • 031 2.464 .000 2.624 .000 
Y17 1.404 • 039 2.703 .000 4.955 .000 
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TABLE XVII I 
RESULTS OF KOLMOGOROV-SMIRKOV TESTS FOR NORMALITY OF ALL VARIABLES, 
AFTER TRANSFORMATIONS, 1975-1979 · 
1975 1977 1979 
Significance Significance Significance 
Variable K-S Z Level K-S Z Level K-S Z Level 
TO TALAS 1. 096 .181 1.132 .154 0.978 .294 
HERF 2.226 .000 2.335 .000 2.620 .ooo 
INCOME 2.449 .000 2.261 .000 2.137 .000 
POP UL 3.227 .ooo 3.098 .000 3.166 .000 
DIST 4.818 .000 4.818 .ooo 4.836 .000 
Y1 0.923 .362 0.630 .822 0.483 .974 
Y2 2.487 .ooo 2.815 • 000 2.958 .000 
Y3 3.272 .000 3.445 .000 
Y4 1.352 .052 1. 314 .063 1.141 .148 
Y5 2.060 .000 1. 757 .004 2.437 .000 
Y6 1.291 .071 1.609 .011 1.546 .017 
Y7 2.812 .000 2.982 .000 3.146 .000 
YB 1. 763 .004 2.233 .000 2.317 .000 
Y9 1.651 .009 1. 511 .021 
YlO 1.586 • 013 2.516 .000 1.654 .008 
Yll 1. 777 .008 2.514 .000 1.114 .167 
Y12 5.751 .000 6.586 .000 4.317 .000 
Y13 4.616 .000 4.810 .000 
Y14 4.976 .000 5.809 .000 4.228 .ooo 
Y15 3.479 .000 4.152 .000 2.468 .000 
Yl6 2.923 .• 000 2.845 .000 2.792 .000 
Y17 3.244 .ooo 3.662 .000 3.674 .000 
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The Regression Results 
All regression equations were estimated using the natural log 
transformat1ons of all variables, except the binary ones and the 
Herfindahl Index number. The regression results are presented in 
Table XIX including the standardized regression coefficients (i.e., 
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the regression coefficients divided by their standard errors) for all 
independent variables, the F-ratio for each coefficient and its signifi~ 
cance level (at the .10 level or lower), and the R2 for each regression. 
The focus of the regression analysis was upon the sign and statis-
tical significance of the coefficient of the CHAINBK variable. At the 
.05 level of significance in at least two of the three years tested, 
only v9 (percentage of total assets paid in salaries and benefits) 
produced positive evidence of differences between unit banks and chain 
banks. The sign was also in the hypothesized direction. 
Relaxation of the significance level requirement to .10 brought 
the evidence on Y1 (the cash funds to total assets ratio) and Y8 (net 
income per employee) into the acceptable range. In both cases, the 
signs were consistently in the hypothesized direction. 
A step-wise procedure was used; however, it contributed no informa-
tion beyond what the direct method produced, other than the step at 
which the CHAINBK variable entered. All seven independent variables 
entered the regression on each trial. 
While the regression equations produced little positive evidence 
about chain bank performance, they did seem to perform well overall. 
The R2 values ·mostly were in the .15-.36 range and the signs of the 
coefficients were consistent and plausable. Although the design of the 



















REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, F-RATIOS, AND SIGNIFICANCE 
LEVELS FOR ALL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent Variable 
Herf Total 
Charter Index Assets Population Distance 
.1314* .1270 -.4458 .0085 -.0138 
8.63 6.30 84. 73 1.05 0.03 
.005 .025 .001 
.1459 .0365 -.4279 .0582 -.0220 
9.96 0.52 71. 86 0.56 0.08 
.005 .001 
.1462 .0152 -.4354 .0282 -.0686 
9.69 0.09 71. 53 0.10 0.66 
.005 .001 
-.0225 -.0175 .4748 - .1835 -.0024 
0.25 0.12 95.93 4.87 0.00 
.001 .os 
-.0297 -.0089 .4412 -.1220 .0293 
0.41 0.03 75.96 2.43 0.15 
.001 
-.0243 -.0492 .4644 -.0945 .1487 
0.27 0.92 83.32 1.18 3.16 
.001 .10 
-.1689 -.1097 . 2341 .0061 .0167 
12.44 4.10 20. 38 0.01 0.04 
.001 .05 .001 
-.1512 -.0155 .1681 .0292 .0619 
9.28 0.08 9.63 0.12 0.57 
.005 .· .005 
Income Chainbk R2 
-.0555 -.1188 .1959 
0.01 7 .91 
.005 
-.0459 -.0770 .1664 
0. 76 3.18 
.10 
-.0053 -.0419 .1521 
0.01 0.89 
-.0181 +.0910 .1943 
0.14 4.63 
.05 
.0335 +.Opl7 .1618 
0.40 2.03 
-.0055 +.0183 .1718 
0.01 0.17 
-.0238 +.0621 .0783 
0.20 1.88 




TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Performance Independent Variable 
Variable Herf Total 
R2 yk Year Charter Index Assets Population Distance Income Chainbk 
Consumer Loans/ .1979 .0989 .0093 -.1521 .4062 -.0568 -.1682 -.0354 .1549 
Total Assets 4.65 0.03 9.38 22.76 0.51 11.09 0.67 
Y4 .05 .005 .001 .001 
' 1977 -.0492 .0380 - .1347 .4600 -.0659 -.1354 -.0186 .1745 
1.14 0.57 7.20 35.08 0. 74 6.64 0.19 
.01 .001 .01 
1975 -.0406 .0674 -.1358 .5520 .0428 - .1362 -.0215 .1704 
0.76 1. 71 7 .12 40.15 0.26 6. 75 0.24 
.01 .001 .01 
Mortgages/ 1979 -.0279 .0556 .1857 .4400 .0555 -.3291 +.0307 .1832 
Tota 1 Assets 0.38 1.19 14.48 27 .63 0.50 43.90 0.52 
Y5 .001 .001 .001 
1977 -.0559 .0120 .2156 .3098 .0154 -. 3247 +.0102 .1402 
1.42 0.05 17.69 15.28 0.04 36.68 0.05 
.001 .001 .001 
1975 -.0367 .0279 .1772 .3530 .0638 -.4092 - ,0317 .1633 
0.62 0.29 12.01 16.27 0.58 60.41 0.52 
.001 .001 .001 
Cof!ll1ercial Loans/ 1979 -.0624 -.0171 .3575 .2412 -.0214 -.0344 + .1020 .3047 
Total Assets 2.25 0.13 63.02 9. 75 0.09 0.56 6.75 
y6 .001 .005 .01 
1977 -.1060 .0246 .2953 .2349 -.1042 -.0058 +.0555 .2590 
5.91 0.27 38.51 10 .19 2.07 0.01 1.86 
.025 .001 .005 
1975 -.1421 .0337 .3112 .2862 -.1237 -.0292 +.0310 .3254 
11. 51 0.53 45.93 13.27 2.69 .038 0.61 
.001 .001 .001 
-...J 
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TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Perfonnance Independent Variable; 
Variable .. Herf Total 
\ Year Charter Index Assets Population Distance Income Chainbk R2 
Tota 1 Ca pi ta 1/ 1979 .1417 .1858 -. 5075 .2470 - .1163 .0402 -.0227 .2004 
Total Assets 10.08 13.56 110.4 8:89 2.24 Q.67 0.29 
Y7 ' .005 .001 .001 .005 
1977 .• 0384 .0798 .4163 .1177 - .1805 .0521 + .0062 .1498 
0.67 2.41 66.30 2.22 5.38 0.95 0.02 
.001 .025 
1975 .0885 .1133 -.4681 .0721 -.3041 .0451 +.0447 .1900 
3. 71 4.96 86.55 0. 70 13.52 o. 76 1.06 
.10 .05 .001 .001 
Net Incoo.e/ 1979 -.0533 -.0170 .2772 -.4671 .,.,0123 .0611 +.0461 .1608 
No. Employees 1.36 0.11 31.39 30.30 0.02 1.47 1.14 
YB .001 .001 
1977 -.0255 .0150 .3834 .2058 .2122 .1387 +.0728 .1681 
0.30 0.09 57.79 6.97 7.65 6.92 2.86 
.001 .01 .01 .01 .10· 
1975 .0562 .0562 .3146 -.3602 ,0186 .1391 +.0724 .1674 
1.46 1.19 38.03 17.04 0.05 7 .01 2.72 
.001 .. 001 .025; .10 
Total Salaries & 1979 -.0706 .0484 -.5608 .3886 -.0686 - .0364 -.1676 .3506 
Benefits/Total 3.08 .. 1.13 166.0 27.10 0.96 0.68 19.47 
Y9 .10 .001 .001 .001 
1977 -.0483 .0617 -.5122 .3386 -.0837 -.0355 -.1032 .3268 
1.35 1.83 159.l 23.31 1.47 0.56 7.09 
.001 .001 .01 
-..J 
N 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Performance Independent Variable 
Variable Herf Total 
R2 yk Year Charter Index Assets Population Distance Income Cha1nbk 
Other Operation .1979 -.0333 .1503 -.4564 • 5163 .0442 -.0620 +.0255 .2729 
Exps/Total Assets 0.61 9.75 98.19 42.73 0.36 1. 75 0.40 
y 10 .005 ,001 ,001 
' 1977 -.0209 .0969 -.3581 .4647 -.0688 -.0618 +.0701 .2239 
0.22 3.92 54.06 38.09 0.86 1.47 2.84 
.001 .001 .10 
1975 -.0927 .1287 -.3184 .5147 - .0791 -.0630 +.0316 .2602 
4.46 7 .01 43.86 39 .14 1.00 1.62 0.58 
.05 .01 .001 .001 
Total Operating Exps/ 1979 -.0642 .0115 -.0371 .3866 -.0621 -.0687 +.0368 .1652 Total Assets 1.99 0.05 0.57 20.87 0.61 1.87 0.73 
y 11 .001 
1977 -.1070 -.0349 -.1200 -. 3460 .0307 -.0758 +.0206 .1079 
s.oo 0.44 5.28 18.37 0.15 1.92 0.21 
.05 .025 .001 
1975 -.0426 .0016 -.0718 -.4576 -.0386 -.2340 +.0038 .1668 
0.84 0.00 1.98 27.47 0.21 19.84 0.01 
.001 .001 
Int. on Time Deps/ 1979 -.0941 - .0825· .5773 - .1794 - .0463 .• 1685 +.0512 .3507 
Tiroo Deps 5.48 3.30 176.0 5.78 0.44 14.48 1.82 
Y12 .025 .10 .001 .025 .001 
1977 -.0744 -.1439 .4306 -.0842 .3055 .0346 +.0300 .1609 
2.57 8.01 72.29 1.16 15.72 0.43 0.48 
.005 .001 .001 
1975 -.0168 -.1111 .4937 .0634 .2108 -.0638 +.0678 .2160 
0.14 4.92 99.46 0 .56 6. 71 1.57 2.53 
.05 .001 .01 " w 
TABLE XIX (Continued) 
Perfonnance Independent Variable 
Variable Herf Total 
yk Year Charter Index Assets Population 
Total Int + 1979 -.1046 - .0376 .2354 .2353 
Fees/Total Loans 5.15 0.52 22.27 7.57 
y 13 .025 .001 .01 
' 1977 -.0889 .0087 .0033 .2380 
3.20 0.03 0.00 8.07 
.10 .005 
Service Charges/ 1979 - .0467 .0403 -.2034 .5969 
Deposits 1. 23 0.72 19.93 58. 39 
y 14 .001 .001 
1977 -.0026 .0162 -.2062 .4494 
0.00 0.12 19.12 37.98 
.001 .001 
1975 .0627 .0865 -.2864 .6141 
2.19 3.45 38.64 60. 71 
.10 .001 .001 
Total Revenue/ 1979 -.1681 .0071 -.0081 .3639 
Tota 1 Assets 13.30 0.02 0.03 18.08 
y15 .001 .001 
1977 -.1714 -.0281 -.0111 .2767 
12.38 0.28 0.04 11. 33 
.001 .001 
1975 -.1078 .0299 -.0222 .3258 
4.85 0.30 0.17 12.62 
.05 .001 
Distance Income 


















































TABLE XIX {Continued) 
Performance 
Independent Variable 
Variable Herf ota 
R2 yk Year Charter Index Assets Population Distance Income Chainbk 
Net Income/ 1979 -.1173 .0746 - .2008 .0185 .0270 -.0129 -.0097 .0943 
Total Assets 6.10 1.9.3 15.26 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.05 
y16 ' 
.025 .001 
1977 -.0658 .0433 -.0305 .1331 .2595 ,0844 +.0983 .0408 
1. 76 0.63 0.32 2.53 9.92 2.22 4.51 
,005 .05 
1975 .0595 .1315 -.1522 -.0631 -.0231 .0960 +.0442 .0412 
1.42 5.64 7.73 0.45 0.07 2.90 0.88 
.025 .01 .10 
Net Income/ 1979 -.0827 .0046 .3083 -.1494 -.1165 -.0402 -.0079 .0804 
Total Capital 2.99 0.01 35.43 2.83 1.95 0.58 0.03 
y17 .10 .001 .10 
1977 -.0492 ,0323 .1185 .1371 .2969 .0614 +.0675 .0386 
0.98 0.35 4.78 2.68 12.96 1.17 2.12 
.05 .001 
1975 .0315 .0658 .0713 - .1172 .0660 0.678 +.0284 .0336 
0.40 1.40 1.68 1.56 0.53 1.43 0.36 
*The top number in each cell is the standardized regression coefficient. The middle number fs f-ratio for the above coefficient. 
The bottom number in each cell is the significance level indicated by the F-ratio. A blank space in the bottom position means the 




evidence about the relative importance of the independent variables is a 
product of regression analysis. Bank size was clearly the dominant 
variable in the equations. Its coefficient was significant at a very 
high level over 80 percent of the time. Following size as an important 
variable were county population and per capita income, which appeared 
significant at the .05 level about 60 percent and 35 percent of the 
time, respectively. 
Summarizing the regression results, acceptable support for the 
hypothesized differences between unit banks and chain banks was found 
in only one performance variable, Total Salaries and Benefits to Total 
Assets. Marginal evidence was found which indicated that chain banks 
tend to hold proportionately lower levels of cash resources than unit 
banks, and that chain banks produce more profit per employee than unit 
banks do. 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis Results 
The procedures recommended by Lachenbruch, Sneeringer, and Revo 
[18] and by Pinches [28] (described in Chapter IV) for dealing with the 
normality problem were followed. Preliminary tests were made using the 
original data and then were rerun using transformed data. In both 
cases, the hypothesis of equal group dispersion matrices was rejected 
at an extremely high significance level. The error rates were uni-
formly lower by small amounts when original data were used. Therefore, 
original data were used for the study. 
Error Rate Estimation 
The error rates were estimated and tested using the Lachenbruch U 
method. Table XX presents the matrix from a normal classification 
TABLE XX 
ESTIMATION OF ERROR RATES USING LACHENBRUCH U METHOD 
1975 1977 1979 
Predictea Percent Predicted Percent Predicted Percent 
Group Correct Group Correct Group Correct 
Pre-Test Classification Matrix: 
Actual Group u c 55.8* u c 60.3* u c 65.4* 
u 190 63 75.1 194 82 70.3 . 194 72 72. 9 
c 141 68 32.5 107 93 46.5 97 126 56.5 
Test Classification Matrix: 
Actual Group .u c 55.6* u c 59.7* u c 64.4* 
u 189 64 74.7 191 85 69.2 191 75 71.8 
c 141 68 32.5 107 93 46.5 99 124 55.6 
* Dver-all percent correctly classified. 
--.i 
--.i 
procedure, using the same data and linear classification rules. The 
test rates were consistently very close to the observed rates, 
indicating the classification model performed very well. 
The Classification Results 
The results of the classification t~ials, using quadratic rules, 
are displayed in Table XXI. Although the overall percentage of cases 
7a 
correctly classified remains quite stable, the percentage of chain 
banks correctly classified declines rather markedly, from 1979 to 1975. 
The increasing error rate in prior years might be the result of chain 
bank practice becoming more clearly delineated from unit bank practices 
as time passes. Or, it could result from the difficulty of correctly 
identifying the chain banks in earlier years. In any event, the 
~-score.s and the x2 scores both were significant at very high levels 
in all three years, and therefore the results were acceptable. 
The standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients are 
listed in Table XXII. The variables considered to be significant were 
those having coefficients with absolute values above the median in at 
least two years. Variables which met those criteria were Y6, Ya, Y9, 
YlO' Y15' Y1 6' Y17 , INCOME, POPUL, DIST, AND CHARTER. 
The next step in the analysis of the MDA output was to determine 
if the classification function coefficients differed in direction 
consistently in the years in which the standardized canonical coeffi-
cients were found to be significant. The classification function 
coefficients are shown in Table XXIII. Ya, Y16 , and Y17 , did not meet 
the consistency test. In 1975 and 1977, the absolute values of the 
canonical coefficients for Y8 were .495 and .401, well above the median 












MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION 























































1z-scores test the hypothesis that classification results occur by chance. All z-scores reject 
the hypothesis at significance level exceeding .001. 
2significance level = 
3s;gnificance level = 
• 0108. 
• 0025. 
4significance level exceeds 0.000. ""-I 
"° 




























STANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 






























































y11 679 .6 
y12 -488.5 












CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FOR ALL 
VARIABLES, ALL YEARS 
1975 1977 1979 
Chains Sign Units Chains Sign Uni ts Chains 
129.9 657.4 656.7 519.1 517.8 
-3.00 458.1 458.8 + 324.3 326.3 
579.6 579.7 + 475.7 476 .6 
-17.4 -98. 5 -100. 5 -36. 7 -38.2 
-28.1 -65. 8 -66.9 -32 .0 -32.8 
-182.7 -131.3 -129.8 + -241.6 -238. 2 
1039 + 434.4 432.6 723.1 722.5 
-3. 36 + -3.42 -3.47 -.296 - . 296 
2289 2195 2104 1973 
1207 + 2131 2194 + 1705 1753 
672.5 171.2 180 .8 + 307. 8 323.1 
-446.6 + 86. 7 91.3 + -340.5 -333.9 
-401.6 -396. 3 + 12.5 39. 7 
-1422 -2181 -2144 + -2289 -2263 
1752 1562 1551 1166 1130 
-2157 3319 3443 + -3398 -3391 
443.4 + 12.6 8.1 452.5 451. 2 
62.0 + 66.9 66.9 74.0 73.4 
6.70 5.93 5.73 5.70 5.52 
- .103 + - .910 -.904 + - .913 -.900 
-19.1 -11.6 -12.2 -12.9 -13.8 
. 230 . 360 .287 .218 . 210 













on the classification function coefficient of Ya was positive in 1975, 
but negative in 1977 (Table XXIII). Therefore, Ya fell out as a 
discriminating variable. The same pattern was true for Y16 and Y17 , 
except that for Y16 , the coefficient signs were negative in 1975 and 
positive in 1977. 
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The performance profile which emerged from the MDA indicates that, 
relative to unit banks, chain banks tend to: 
1. Make more commercial and industrial loans; 
2. Pay lower salaries and benefits; 
3. Experience higher Other Operating Expenses; 
4. Generate lower total revenue; 
5. Be located in counties having lower per capita income; 
6. Be located in more populous counties; 
7. Be state-chartered; and 
a. Be located closer to metropolitan areas. 
Summary and Analysis 
Various hypotheses of chain bank behavior were advanced in Chapter 
II. The profiles of chain banking produced by the three statistical 
methods are reviewed below and reconciled relative to those hypotheses. 
Portfolio Composition 
Substantial support was found for the hypothesis that chain banks 
maintain less liquid, higher-risk asset portfolios than unit banks. 
The choice of particular assets preferred by chain banks appears to be. 
increased commercial loans. All three tests reflect evidence that 
chain banks hold less of their assets in cash items and make more 
commercial loans than unit banks, but in only isolated instances was 
support found for the hypotheses of more municipals, more total loans, 
more consumer loans, and more residential loans by chain banks. Table 
XXIV presents the test results in. detail. 
TABLE XXIV 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TEST RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES OF PORTFOLIO 
COMPOSITION; BY DIRECTION OF CHAIN BANK DIFFERENCE 
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Si gni f. Signif. Hypoth. 
Variable Year t-test Level MR Level MDA Sign 
Cash Assets 1979 .000 .005 
Total Assets 1977 .012 
Municipals 1979 + .026 + .05 + + Total Assets 
Total Loans 1979 + .012 + Total Assets 
Consumer Loans 1977 + Total Assets 
Residential Mtgs 1975 + .049 
Total Assets + 
Commercial Loans 1979 + .000 + .05 + + 
Total Assets 1977 + .008 + 
1975 + .010 
Capital Position and Liability Structure 
No evidence was located in support of the hypothesis that chain 
banks maintain- lower capital-to-total assets ratios than unit banks. 
Only in the MDA results for 1975 did Y7 appear as an influential 
variable, when it had a standardized canonical coefficient of 0.415. 
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The sign, however, was positive, rather than negative, as hypothesized. 
Thus, what little evidence did appear indicated higher capital ratios 
for chain banks, not lower. 
Operational Efficiency 
This group of variables, Y8 through Y11 , provided good evidence 
of chain bank differences, as shown in Table XXV. 
TABLE XXV 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TEST RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES OF OPERATIONAL 
EFFICIENCY; BY DIRECTION OF CHAIN BANK DIFFERENCES 
Si gnif. Signif. Hypoth. 
Variable Year t-test Level MR Level MDA. Sign 
Net Income 1977 + 
Per Employee 1975 + 
Tot. Sal + Ben. 1979 .003 .001 
Total Assets 1977 .01 
Other OQ. EXQ. 1979 + + 
Total Assets 1977 + .025 + + 
1975 + .043 + 
Total OQ. EXQ. 1979 + .022 + Total Assets 
Evidence on Y8, Net Income Per Employee, was produced only by MDA 
and it was internally contradictory. A conclusion of no difference 
between groups appears warranted. 
The variables Y9 and Y10 , Total Salaries and Benefits to Total 
Assets, and Other Operating Expenses to Total Assets, respectively, 
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produced strong evidence of chain bank differences. The significance 
- . 
levels were good across time as well as statistical methods, and the 
signs were uniformly in the expected direction. 
Chain banks definitely appear to compensate their employees with 
lower salaries and fringe benefits than unit banks do, relative to the 
bank's total assets. And they also appear to incur significantly 
higher Other Operating Expenses than unit banks do. 
The evidence with respect to the Total Operating Expenses to Total 
Assets ratio, however, is unconvincing. The failure of the tests of Y11 
to corroborate the results on Y10 seems contradictory. Perhaps chain 
banks are able to offset higher Other Operating Expenses with greater 
employee efficiency, and thereby hold Total Operating Expenses steady. 
Rates on Deposits and Loans 
The hypotheses that chain banks pay higher interest rates on time 
deposits (Y 12 ) and charge higher interest rates and fees on loans (Y 13 ) 
received only negligible support from the tests, as Table XXVI shows. 
TABLE XXVI 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TEST RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES OF RATES AND 
PRICES; BY DIRECTION OF CHAIN BANK DIFFERENCE 
Signif. Signif. Hypoth. 
Variable Year t-test Level MR Level MDA Sign 
Int. on TD 1 s 1979 + .039 + 
1975 
Total Int. + Fees 1979 + .002 + + Total Loans 
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There was no support whatsoever for the higher service charges 
argument. Chain banks and unit banks appear to perform similarly on 
Profitability 
The test results are inconclusive with respect to the profitability 
measures, Y15 through Y17 (Table XXVII). 
TABLE XXVII 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TEST RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES OF 
PROFITABILITY; BY DIRECTION OF CHAIN BANK DIFFERENCE 
Signif. Signif. 
Variable Year t-test Level MR Level MDA. 
Total Revenue 1979 
Total Assets 1977 
Net Income 1977 + .05 + 
Total Assets 1975 
Net Income 1977 






The failure of the tests to confirm results across time periods 
coupled with conflicting signs produced by the three methods makes it 
impossible to draw any conclusions about the impact of chain affilia-
tion upon profitability. 
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Demograhpics 
The t-tests and MDA produced some strong evidence about the popula-
tion of counties in which chains are located, and the distance the 
chain banks tend to be from large cities, relative to the unit banks. 
These results are in Table XXVIII. 
TABLE XXVIII 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT TEST RESULTS ABOUT POPUL AND DIST; 
BY DIRECTION OF CHAIN BANK DIFFERENCE 
Variable Year t-test Significance MDA 
POP UL 1979 + .007 + 
1977 + .016 
1975 + .006 + 
DIST 1979 .000 
1977 .002 
1975 .001 
The MDA results indicated that per capita income tended to be 
lower in counties having chain banks, and that chain banks tended to 
hold state charters, but the t-tests did not confirm that evidence. 
Table XXIX summarizes the significant findings of this research, 
along with the hypothesized sign for each performance measure, and the 
results of prior studies of multiple office banking performance. 
M,ost of the hypotheses about chain bank differences were not 
supported by the tests. Moreover, few of the performance earmarks of 
TABLE XXIX 
RESULTS OF TESTS OF MULTIPLE OFFICE BANK PERFORMANCE VARIABLES~ THIS RESEARCH 
AND FIVE MAJOR PRIOR STUDIES; BY DIRECTION OF DIFFERENCE 
OF MULTIPLE OFFICE SYSTEM 
Horvitz 
Performance & Shul 1 Lawrence Mei ns ter Mayne Fraser Hi 11 Hypo th es i zed 
Measure (1964) (1967) (1975) (1977) (1978) Sign 
Cash Asse-ts 
Total Assets 
Munici~als + + + - ND + Tota 1 Assets 
Total Loans + + + ND + Total Assets -
Consumer Loans + + ND + Total Assets 
Mortgages ND + + ND + Tota 1 Assets 
Commercial Loans ND + + Total Assets -
Tota 1 Capita 1 
Total Assets ND - ND + 
Net Income Per 
Employee ND + 
Total Sal + Ben ND Tota 1 As sets 
co 
co 
TABLE XXIX (Continued) 
Horvitz 
Performance & Shull Lawrence Meinster Mayne Fraser Hi 11 Hypothesized 
.Measure (1964) (1967) (1975) ( 1977) (1978) Sign 
Other oe Exe + + + + Total Assets 
Total oe Exe + + ND Total Assets 
Int on TD + ND Time Deps -
Total Int + Fees + ND ND ND + Total Loans -
Service.~ + + + + ND ND + Total Assets 
Tota 1 Revenue 
* + Total Assets 
Net Income ND + ND * + Total Assets -
Net Income + ND + * + Total Capital -
NOTE: ND indicates no statistical difference was found. A blank space indicates the 




multiple-office banking, as reported by other writers, were found to be 
true of the chain banks in Oklahoma. Table XXIX indicates that the 
only characteristics which Oklahoma chain banks consistantly have in 
common with multiple-office systems studied by other researchers are 
lower Liquid Assets ratios and higher Other Operating Expenses ratios. 
The evidence presented in Table XXIX largely refutes the widely held 
belief that chain banking provides a multiple-office alternative to 
unit banking in a state in which multiple-office banking is prohibited. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purposes of this research were to identify all the chain banks 
in Oklahoma and then to analyze their overall performance characteristics 
relative to the unit banks in the State. In addition, the results were 
compared to those of prior studies of multiple-office banking systems 
to see if the performance of the chain bank structure in Oklahoma 
resembles that of multiple-office structures elsewhere. The chain banks 
were successfully identified for the years 1975, 1977, and 1979, and 
they are listed in Appendix A. 
Chain Banking in Oklahoma 
The chain bank structure in Oklahoma has grown substantially since 
1962. The number of chain banks has nearly tripled, so that nearly 
one-half of all Oklahoma banks are chain affiliated. Slightly over 
one-half of all bank assets in Oklahoma are held by chain banks, 
although the growth rate of chain bank assets has been somewhat slower 
than the rate of growth of the number of chain banks. The slower growth 
of assets perhaps is the result of new chain banks often being de nova 
banks, initially having low assets. 
No parti~ular structural patterns within the chains emerged, other 
than that most chains consist of only two or three banks. Proximity 
to a metropolitan area and higher county population both appear to be 
related to chain membership. 
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Performance Characteristics of Unit and 
Ch~in Banking in Oklahoma 
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The overall hypothesis of this research was that chain banks in 
Oklahoma perform differently from unit banks in the State. Substantial 
evidence was uncovered which indicates that chain banks do, in a 
limited way, operate differently from unit banks. 
Chain bankers appear to take greater risks than unit bankers, as 
demonstrated by their willingness to reduce cash balances and increase 
credit to local businesses through increased levels of commercial loans. 
They also appear to combine some banking operations and thereby reduce 
labor costs; as implied by a lower ratio of salaries and benefits-to-
total assets. Also implied is a higher level of efficiency by the 
chain banks. 
Evidence of the expected increase in Other Operating Expenses 
appeared, suggesting the payment of transfer fees to the lead bank in 
the chain. Thus, it appears that chain banks differ from unit banks 
in four performance areas: lower cash reserves, higher commercial 
loan portfolios, lower salaries and benefits, and higher other operating 
expenses. 
The results of this study perhaps are more significant for what 
evidence was not found, than for what was. Overall, Oklahoma bankers 
who associate themselves with chain organizations do not appear to 
pursue aggressively the potential benefits of chain bank participation. 
They only minimally exploit the potential diversification effects. 
While cash bal~nces are reduced and commercial loans are increased, 
the Total Loans ratio was no different. Only the analysis of the 
sub-popultion parameters found evidence of differences in the ratios 
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of Municipals, or Residential Mortgage Loans. No evidence of increased 
Consumer Loans was found. Furthermore, the capital ratios of unit 
banks and chain banks tend to be similar, as do pricing practices. 
Two possible explanations for the behavior of the chain banks are: 
(1) the chains perhaps are too small to exploit the advantages of their 
associations more fully, or (2) bankers join chains to increase their 
monopoly power. If the latter were true, chains would form within 
markets, and behavior would become less risky (see page 17). The signs 
on the coefficients would be in the opposite direction from what was 
hypothesized. Neither the structural patterns nor any of the results 
of the study support the monopoly idea. Thus, the motivation behind 
the rapid increase in the number of chain banks in the last 20 years 
is not clear. 
Comparison of Chain Performance and 
Other Multiple Office Systems 
It is clear, however, that the chain bank system in Oklahoma 
produces few of the performance characteristics of multiple-office 
systems in use in other states. Neither the Oklahoma banking public 
nor Oklahoma bankers secure many of the,benefits of multiple-office 
banking. Contrary to the widely held belief, the chain bank system, 
as it exists in Oklahoma, does not provide a very effective de facto 
multiple-office system. The unit rule does seem to be substantially 
effective in blocking multiple-office activity in Oklahoma. 
Generalizing the results of this research beyond the boundaries 
of Oklahoma requires that the sub-populations be considered as 
representative samples of chain and unit banks elsewhere. Chain bank 
activity tends to be strongest in unit bank states [8] [26], of which 
94 
Oklahoma is one. It is in those states, where banking regulation is 
- . 
basically similar to that of Oklahoma, that banking conditions and 
practices are likely to resemble closely those present in Oklahoma. 
Thus, the evidence about chain banking in Oklahoma can reasonably be 
inferred to shed light on chain banking practices in other unit banking 
states as well. 
While chain banking is strongest in unit banking states, it does 
occur throughout the country in a significant way. Darnell [8] reported 
20 percent of all banks in the U.S. were chain affiliated. Therefore, 
these results can be further generalized to unit-chain bank relation-
ships in multiple-office banking states as well, although probably with 
somewhat less validity. 
Present Limitations and Future Research 
A significant objective of future research into chain banking 
must be to overcome the limited geographic scope of the study. Accurate 
identification of the chains will continue to be a major difficulty, 
if present reporting requirements remain in effect. Because the 
computer-constructed lists contained error of 10-15 percent, it would 
be hazardous to apply that method without the ability to verify the 
results, as was done in this study, through industry contacts. On a 
national scale, that would be extremely difficult. 
Another problem for future solution is to provide for lags in the 
variables. Clearly, it takes time for new strategies arising from a 
change in status to become effective and show up in a bank 1 s performance 
variables. Under present reporting requirements, it is impossible to 
determine when a bank changed its status. 
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Implications for Public Policy 
Comparison of the results of this research with those of prior 
studies of multiple-office systems (Table XXIX) makes clear that 
Oklahoma banks do not follow the performance patterns produced by banks 
in other states which permit multiple-office banking. Of particular 
concern is the lower level of credit provided by Oklahoma banks to 
their local commjnities including the resulting effects upon prices 
and interest rates. Although chain banks do appear to provide more 
commercial loans and may buy more municipal bonds, they do not make 
more consumer loans or more total loans, and they may not make more 
residential mortgage loans. To the extent that local credit needs 
are not met by local lenders, local business either is constrained by 
the banking system, or must seek sources of credit outside the state. 
In either case, the present system does not appear optimal. 
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BANKS WHICH ARE CHAIN MEMBERS--1979 
TENTH FRS DISTRICT 
Bank. 
Citizens Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank of Alex 
Farmers State Bank · 
Alva State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank of Alva 
Anadarko Bank and Trust Company 
Exchange National Bank and Trust Company 
Barnsdall State Bank 
First National Bank in Bartlesville 
Plaza National Bank of Bartlesville 
Union Bank and Trust 
Bank of Beggs 
Binger Community Bank 
Citizens Security Bank and Trust Company 
Town and County Bank 
Peoples State Bank 
First State Bank 
American National Bank of Bristow 
Arkansas Valley State Bank 
Washita State Bank 
First National Bank of Calumet 
Bank of Canton 
First State Bank 
Cashion CoITTTiunity Bank 
1st Bank of Catoosa 
First State Bank 
Union National Bank of Chandler 
First Bank of Chattanooga 
First National Bank of Chelsea 
Alfalfa County Bank 
Chickasha Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank and Trust Company of 
Chickasha 
Choctaw State Bank 
Bank of Commerce 
First Bank in Claremore 
Cleo State Bank 
Oklahoma Bank and Trust Company 
Security State Bank 
Farmers National Bank of Cordell 
Security National Bank of Coweta 
Eighty Niner Bank of Coyle 
Bank of Crescent 
Farmers and Merchants. ,Bank 






































Ho 1denvil1 e 
Holdenville 








TABLE. XXX (Continued) 
Bank 
Cyri 1 State Bank 
Security State Bank 
First National Bank of Davis 
Del State Bank and Trust Company 
Bank of Drummond 
Citizens Bank 
Central State Bank 
Bank of Elgin 
First National Bank of Elk City 
First State Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
El Reno 
Central National Bank and Trust 
Community Bank and Trust Company 
First Nationa 1 Bank and Trust Company of 
Enid 
Northwest Bank of Enid 
Security National Bank of Enid 
First State Bank 
Fairview State Bank 
First National Bank of Fletcher 
First State Bank 
First National Bank in Fort Gibson 
Fort Sill National Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank of Gracemont 
First State Bank 
State Bank of Grove 
First National Bank of Guthrie 
First State Bank and Trust Company 
Bank of Haileyville 
First State Bank 
Bank of Hartshorne 
Bank of Healdton 
First National Bank of Hennessey 
First State Bank 
Home State Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Ho 1 den vi 11 e 
Peoples State Bank and Trust Company 
First State Bank and Trust Company 
Hopeton State Bank 
Bank of Hydro 
Bank of Inola 
Delaware County Bank 
Bank of Commerce 
Fi rs t State Bank 
















































TABLE XXX {Continued) 
Bank 
First National Bank of Konawa 
Oklahoma State Bank 
Bank of the Lakes 
Citizens Bank 
City National Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank of Leedey 
First State Bank 
American Exchange Bank 
First State Bank 
First National Bank of Luther 
American Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
McAlester 
Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank of Mangum 
Mannford State Bank 
Bank of Marshall 
Citizens State Bank 
Bank of Meeker 
Meno Guaranty Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Miami 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Midwest National Bank 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Citizens State Bank 
Sequoyah State Bank of Muldrow 
American Bank of Muskogee 
Commercial Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Muskogee 
First Mustang State Bank 
Mustang Community Bank 
Bank of Newcastle 
First State Bank 
City National Bank and Trust 
First National Bank of Okeene 
State Guaranty Bank 
Citizens State Bank 
Allied Oklahoma Bank 
Capital Hill State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank 
City National Bank 
Crossroads State Bank 
Fidelity Bank 
First National Bank of Britton 












Oklahoma Ci ty 
Oklahoma City 
Oologah 



































TABLE XXX (Continued) 
Bank 
First Security Bank and Trust Company 
Founders Bank and Trust Company 
Grant Square Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank and Trust Company 
Quail Creek National Association 
Penn Square Bank 
Southwestern Bank and Trust Company 
Republic Bank 
United Oklahoma Bank 
Union Bank and Trust Company 
Will Rogers Bank and Trust Company 
Lakeside State Bank 
First National Bank of Pauls Valley 
First National Bank in Pawhuska 
National Bank of Commerce in Pawhuska 
Rolling Hills State Bank 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Poteau State Bank 
Prague National Bank 
American Bank of Oklahoma 
First American Bank and Trust 
McClain City National Bank 
Bank of Quapaw 
Farmers State Bank 
Bank of Red Oak 
Ringling State Bank 
State Bank of Rocky 
American Bank of 
First National Bank 
First Bank and Trust Company 
Sand Springs State Bank 
American National Bank and Trust 
City National Bank of Sayre 
First National Bank of Seminole 
Southwest State Bank 
Federal National Bank and Trust 
Shidler State Bank 
Exchange Bank 
Bank of the Wichitas 
First National Bank and Trust 
First American Bank 
First American Bank 
First State Bank 
Stroud National Bank 
Sulphur Community Bank 
First National Bank of Tahlequah 





































Westvi 11 e 
Wilburton 
Wilburton 












First National Bank of Temple 
First State Bank in Temple 
The Village Bank 
First National Bank of Thomas 
·First National Bank of Tipton 
Service Bank of Tonkawa 
Bank of Corrmerce and Trust Company 
Admiral State Bank 
Boulder Bank and Trust Company 
American Bank of Tulsa 
City Bank and Trust Company 
Commercial Bank 
Guaranty National Bank 
Mercantile Bank and Trust Company 
North Side State Bank 
Southwest Tulsa Bank 
Security Bank 
Republic Bank and Trust Company 
United Bank 
Utica National Bank and Trust Company 
Woodland Bank 
Western National Bank of Tulsa 
Bank of Tuttle 
Bank of Verden 
American Bank of Wagoner 
First Wagoner Bank and Trust Company 
Citizens Bank 
Walters Bank and Trust Company 
Community Bank 
First State Bank 
First Fanners National Bank of Waurika 
Security State Bank 
Welch State Bank 
Peoples Bank 
Latimer State Bank 
Wilburton State Bank 
First State Bank 
Bank of Wyandotte 
First Bank in Atoka 
American State Bank 
First Bank and Trust 
Bryand County National Bank 
First National Bank in Coalgate 
Durant Bank and Trust Company 








TABLE XXX (Continued) 
Bank 
Texoma Bank 
First National Bank in Madill 
First State Bank 
Wright City State Bank 
First National Bank 
















































BANKS WHICH ARE CHAIN MEMBERS--1977 
TENTH FRS DISTRICT 
Bank 
Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Ada 
First National Bank of Alex 
Fanners State Bank 
Alva State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank of Alva 
Anadarko Bank and Trust Company 
Exchange National Bank and Trust Company 
Barnsdall State Bank 
First National Bank in Bartlesville 
Plaza National Bank of Bartlesville 
Union Bank and Trust 
Bank of Beggs 
Binger Community Bank 
Bank of Bixby 
Citizens Security Bank and Trust Company 
Peoples State Bank 
First State Bank 
American National Bank of Bristow 
Arkansas Valley State Bank 
Washita State Bank 
First National Bank of Calumet 
Bank of Canton 
First State Bank 
First Bank of Catoosa 
First State Bank 
Union National Bank of Chandler 
First National Bank of Chattanooga 
First National Bank of Chelsea 
Alfalfa County Bank 
Chickasha Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank and Trust Company of 
Chickasha 
Choctaw State Bank 
Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank in Claremore 
Cleo State Bank 
Oklahoma Bank and Trust Company 
Security State Bank 
Farmers National Bank of Cordell 
Security National Bank of Coweta 
Bank of Crescent 
Farmers and Merchants Bank 
First National Bank of Custer 



































Ho 1 den vi 11 e 
Ho 1denvi11 e 











TABLE· XXXI (Continued) 
Bank 
Security State Bank 
First National Bank of Davis 
Del State Bank and Trust Company 
Bank of Drummond 
Citizens Bank 
Central State Bank· 
Bank of Elgin 
First National Bank of Elk City 
First State Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
El Reno 
Central National Bank and Trust 
Community Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Enid 
Northwest Bank of Enid 
Security National Bank of Enid 
First State Bank 
Fairview State Bank 
First National Bank of Fletcher 
First National Bank of Fort Gibson 
Fort Sill National Bank 
First National Bank in Frederick 
First National Bank of Gracemont 
First State Bank 
State Bank of Grove 
First National Bank of Guthrie 
Bank of Haileyville 
First State Bank 
Bank of Hartshorne 
Bank of Healdton 
First National Bank of Hennessey 
First State Bank 
Home State Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Holdenville 
Poeples State Bank and Trust Company 
First State Bank and Trust Company 
Hopeton State Bank 
Bank of Hydro 
Bank of Inola 
Delaware County Bank 
Bank of Comnerce 
First State Bank 
First State Bank 
First National Bank of Konawa 
Oklahoma State Bank 













































Ok 1 ahoma City 
Ok 1 ahoma City 
Oklahoma City 
Oklahoma City 
Ok l ah om a City 
Oklahoma City 
TABLE XXXI (Continued) 
Bank 
Citizens National Bank of Lawton 
City National Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank of Leedey 
American Exchange Bank 
First State Bank 
First National Bank of Luther 
American Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
McAlester 
Bank of Comnerce 
First National Bank of Mangum 
Mannford State Bank 
Bank of Marshall 
Citizens State Bank 
Bank of Meeker 
Meno Guaranty Bank 
First National Bank of Miami 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Citizens State Bank 
Sequoyah State Bank of Muldrow 
American Bank of Muskogee 
Commercial Bank and Trust Company 
First Mustang State Bank 
Bank of Newcastle 
First State Bank 
City National Bank and Trust 
First National Bank in Okeene 
State Guaranty Bank 
Citizens State Bank 
Capital Hill State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank 
City National Bank and Trust Co~pany 
Fidelity Bank 
First National Bank and Trust 
First National Bank of Britton 
Friendly National Bank 
First Security Bank and Trust Company 
Founders Ban.k and Trust Company 
Grant Square Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank and Trust Company 
Quail Creek National Association 
Penn Square Bank 
Shepherd Mall State Bank 
Southwestern Bank and Trust Co~pany 
Republic Bank 
United Oklahoma Bank 
Union Bank and Trust Company 


















































TABLE XXXI (Continued) 
Bank 
Lakeside State Bank 
First National Bank of Pauls Valley 
First National Bank in.Pawhuska · 
National Bank of Commerce in Pawhuska 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Poteau State Bank 
Prague National Bank 
American Bank of Oklahoma 
First American Bank and Trust 
McClain City National Bank 
Bank of Quapaw 
Farmers State Bank 
Bank of Red Oak 
Ringling State Bank 
State Bank of Rocky 
First National Bank 
First Bank and Trust Company 
Sand Springs State Bank 
American National Bank and Trust 
City National Bank of Sayre 
First National Bank of Seminole 
Southwest State Bank 
Federal National Bank and Trust 
Shidler State Bank 
Exchange Bank 
Bank of the Wichitas 
Case State Bank 
First National Bank of Stratford 
First State Bank 
Stroud National Bank 
Sulphur Conmunity Bank 
First National Bank of Tahlequah 
Dewey County State Bank 
First National Bank of Temple 
First State Bank in Temple 
The Village Bank 
First National Bank of Thomas 
First National Bank of Tipton 
Service Bank of Tonkawa 
Bank of Commerce and Trust Company 
Admiral State Bank 
Boulder Bank and Trust Company 
American Bank of Tulsa 
City Bank and Trust Company 
Eastland Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Tulsa 




































TABLE XXXI (Continued) 
Bank 
Mercantile Bank and Trust Company 
North Side State Bank 
Southwest Tulsa Bank 
Security Bank 
Republic Bank and Trust Company 
United Bank · 
Utica National Bank and Trust Company 
Bank of Tuttle 
Bank of Verden 
American Bank of Wagoner 
First Wagoner Bank and Trust Company 
Citizens Bank 
Walters Bank and Trust Companu 
Community Bank 
First State Bank 
First Farmers National Bank of Waurika 
Security State Bank 
Welch State Bank 
Peoples Bank 
Wilburton State Bank 
First State Bank 
Bank of Wyandotte 
First Bank in Atoka 
American State Bank 
First Bank and Trust 
Bryan County National Bank 
First National Bank in Coalgate 
Durant Bank and Trust Company 
First State Bank of Idabel 
Texoma Bank 
First National Bank in Madill 
First State Bank 

















































BANKS WHICH ARE CHAIN MEMBERS--1975 
TENTH FRS DISTRICT 
Bank 
Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Ada 
First National Bank of Alex 
Farmers State Bank 
Alva State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank of Alva 
Anadarko Bank and Trust Company 
Exchange National Bank and Trust Company 
Barnsdall State Bank 
First National Bank in Bartlesville 
Plaza National Bank of Bartlesville 
Union Bank and Trust 
Bank of Beggs 
Binger Community Bank 
Citizens Security Bank and Trust Company 
Peoples State Bank 
First State Bank 
American National Bank of Bristow 
Arkansas Valley State Bank 
First National Bank of Calumet 
Bank of Canton 
First State Bank 
First Bank of Catoosa 
First State Bank 
Union National Bank of Chandler 
First National Bank of Chattanooga 
First National Bank of Chelsea 
Alfalfa City National Bank 
Chickasha Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank and Trust Company of 
Chickasha 
Choctaw State Bank 
Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank in Claremore 
Cleo State Bank 
Oklahoma Bank and Trust Company 
Security State Bank 
Farmers National Bank of Cordell 
Security National Bank of Cordell 
Bank of Crescent 
Farmers and Merchants Bank 
First National Bank of Custer 
Cyril State Bank 
Security State Bank 
First National Bank of Davis 
Del State Bank 
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TABLE XXXII (Continued) 
Town Bank 
Drummond Bank of Drumnond 
Drumright Citizens Bank 
Elk City First National Bank of Elk City 
Elmore City First State Bank 
El Reno First National Bank of El Reno 
Enid Cent~al National Bank and Trust 
Enid Community Bank and Trust Company 
Enid First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Enid 
Enid Northwest Bank of Enid 
Enid Security National Bank of Enid 
Fairfax First State Bank 
Fairvie.v Fairview State Bank 
Fl etcher First National Bank of Fletcher 
Fort Gibson First National Bank in Fort Gibson 
Fort Si 11 Fort Sill National Bank 
Frederick First National Bank in Frederick 
Gracemont First National Bank of Gracemont 
Grandfi eM First State Bank 
Grove State Bank of Grove 
Guthrie First National Bank of Guthrie 
Hail eyvi 11 e Bank of Haileyville 
Harrah First State Bank 
Hartshorne Bank of Hartshorne 
Healdton Bank of Healdton 
Hennessey First National Bank of Hennessey 
Hinton First State Bank 
Hobart Home State Bank 
Holden vi 11 e First National Bank and Trust Company of 
Ho 1 den vi 11 e 
Holden vi 11 e Peoples State Bank and Trust Company 
Ho 11 is First State Bank and Trust Company 
Hopeton Hopeton State Bank 
Hydro Bank of Hydro 
Inola Bank of Inola 
Jay Delaware County Bank 
Jenks Bank of Commerce 
Jones First State Bank 
Ketchum First State Bank 
Konawa First National Bank of Konawa 
Konawa Oklahoma State Bank 
Lawton Citizens National Bank of Lawton 
Lawton City National Bank and Trust Company 
Leedey First National Bank of Leedey 
Lindsay American Exchange Bank 
Lone Wal f First State Bank 
Luther First National Bank of Luther 


















































TABLE XXXII (Continued) 
Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company of 
McAlester 
Bank of Commerce 
First National Bank of Mangum 
Mannford State Bank 
Bank of Marshall 
Citizens State Bank 
Bank of Meeker 
Meno Guaranty Bank 
First National Bank of Miami 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Citizens State Bank 
Sequoyah State Bank of Muldrow 
American Bank of Muskogee 
Commercial Bank and Trust Company 
First Mustang Stage Bank 
Bank of Newcastle 
First State Bank 
City National Bank and Trust 
First National Bank in Okeene 
State Guaranty Bank 
Citizens State Bank 
Capitol Hill State Bank and Trust Company 
Central National Bank 
City National Bank and Trust Company 
Crossroads State Bank 
Fidelity Bank 
Fi rs t Na1t i ona 1 Bank and Trust 
First National Bank of Britton 
Friendly National Bank 
First State Bank and Trust Company 
Founders Bank and Trust Company 
Grant Square Bank and Trust Company 
May Avenue Bank and Trust Company 
Oklahoma National Bank of Oklahoma City 
Quail Creek Bank 
Penn Square Bank 
Shepherd Mall 3tate Bank 
Southwestern Bank and Trust Company 
Republic Bank 
Stock Yards Bank 
Will Rogers Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank of Pauls Valley 
First National Bank in Pawhuska 
National Bank of Commerce in Pawhuska 
Security Bank and Trust Company 
Poteau State Bank 




















































TABLE XXXII (Continued) 
Bank 
American Bank of Oklahoma 
First American Bank and Trust 
McClain City National Bank 
Bank of Quapaq 
Farmers State Bank 
Bank of Red Oak 
Ringling State Bank 
State Bank of Rocky 
First National Bank 
First National Bank and Trust Company 
American National Bank and Trust 
City National Bank of Sayre 
First National Bank of Seminole 
Southwest State Bank 
Federal National Bank and Trust 
Shidler State Bank 
Exchange Bank 
Bank of the Wichita 
First National Bank of Stratford 
First State Bank 
Stroud National Bank 
Sulphur Community Bank 
First National Bank of Tahlequah 
Dewey County State Bank 
First National Bank of Temple 
First National Bank in Temple 
The Village Bank 
First National Bank of Thomas 
First National Bank of Tipton 
Service Bank of Tonkawa 
Bank of Commerce of Tulsa 
Admiral State Bank 
Baul der Bank and Trust Company 
American Bank of Tulsa 
City Bank and Trust Company 
First National Bank and Trust of Tulsa 
Guaranty National Bank 
Mercantile Bank and Trust Company 
North Side State Bank 
Southwest Tulsa Bank 
Security Bank 
· Re pub 1 i c Bank and Trust Company 
United Bank 
Utica National Bank and Trust Company 
Bank of Tuttle 
Bank of Verden 
American Bank of Wagoner 
























TABLE XXXII (Continued) 
Bank 
Bank of Wa 1 ters 
Conmunity National Bank of Warr Acres 
Fi rs t State Bank 
First Farmers .National Bank of Waurika 
Security State Bank 
Welch State Bank 
Peoples Bank 
Wilburton State Bank 
First State Bank 
Bank of Wyandotte 
First Bank in Atoka 
Fi rs t Bank and Trust 
Bryan County National Bank 
First National Bank in Coalgate 
Durant Bank and Trust Company 
First State Bank of Idabel 
Texoma Bank 
First National Bank in Madill 
First State Bank 
Wright City State Bank 
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APPENDIX B 
SCATTERPLOTS OF ALL REGRESSION EQUATIONS WHICH 
PRODUCED SIGNIFICANT F-RATIOS FOR 
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